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Reimagining the Estate Tax in the
Automation Era
Jay A. Soled*
In a technological age, labor no longer plays the central role it once
did in the nation’s economy. Instead, automation has become more
ubiquitous. This economic transformation has important and farreaching consequences for the nation’s tax system and, in particular, the
means by which to fund public expenditures.
Under current law, the central underpinning to automation—
namely, capital—yields income that is either lightly taxed or, in some
instances, escapes taxation altogether. This puts tremendous stress on
the nation’s coffers and further perpetuates wealth disparities. Yet,
levying a heavier capital gains tax burden might (i) dissuade taxpayers
from realizing their gains and (ii) in a global arena, result in capital
flight to lower tax jurisdictions.
Another possibility exists. Congress should impose a meaningful
estate tax. Such a tax is essentially the equivalent of a deferred tax on
capital income. A reimagined estate tax can help restore fiscal solvency,
promote greater wealth equity, foster capital gains recognition, and
minimize capital flight risk.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the course of the past century, the justifications for instituting and
retaining the estate tax have essentially been twofold in nature. The estate tax is
necessary, first, to augment revenues to meet public expenditures, and, second, to
prevent dynastic wealth and the concentration of power within family units.1 And,
at least to a limited extent, the estate tax has admirably helped fulfill both of these
objectives.2
In formulating these public policy objectives, context is important. Bear in
mind that Congress enacted the estate tax in 1916 when World War I was raging
and the robber baron era was plateauing.3 Put differently, this was a time period
during which severe military demands were being placed on the nation’s budget,4
and there was tangible concern that wealth centralization was infecting the political

1. See infra Section II.A.
2. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron, The One-Hundredth Anniversary of the Federal Estate Tax: It’s Time
to Renew Our Vows, 57 B.C. L. REV. 823 (2016) (pointing out the achievements of the estate tax);
Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 (1983) (same); James
R. Repetti, The Case for the Estate and Gift Tax, 86 TAX NOTES 1493 (2000) (same).
3. Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No. 64-271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
4. See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 13 (2004) (“Belligerency would require, [President Wilson] warned, ‘the organization and
mobilization of all the material resources of the country.’ The Treasury would have to grant massive
credits to the other governments at war with Germany, and Wilson at once announced his intention to
raise those credits . . . .”); Anne L. Alstott & Ben Novick, War, Taxes, and Income Redistribution in the
Twenties: The 1924 Veterans’ Bonus and the Defeat of the Mellon Plan, 59 TAX L. REV. 373 (2006)
(explaining how World War I played a fundamental role in shaping the nation’s tax system).
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system in ways that were corrosive.5 While the estate tax was no panacea, its
institution was a practical response to both of these concerns.
Fast-forward to a century later. Automation in the forms of plant, machinery,
and robotics is rapidly transforming the workplace. Consider the fact that when
Congress first instituted the estate tax, labor in the form of farm workers and bluecollar assembly-line workers was the dominant economic force.6 This is no longer
the case. Automation is eradicating millions of jobs and whole industries.7 And this
transformation process has important implications for the nation’s tax system, a
system that has been historically heavily reliant on tax revenue derived from labor

5. See, e.g., Paul L. Caron & James R. Repetti, Occupy the Tax Code: Using the Estate Tax to
Reduce Inequality and Spur Economic Growth, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1255 (2013) (explaining how Congress
has used and can continue to use the estate tax as a means to mitigate wealth disparities).
6. See Peter F. Drucker, The Age of Social Transformation, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Nov. 1994, at
53 (tracing the history of labor during the twentieth century).
7. See, e.g., MARTIN FORD, RISE OF THE ROBOTS: TECHNOLOGY AND THE THREAT OF A
JOBLESS FUTURE (2015) (presenting a compelling and comprehensive case that technology is
eradicating many jobs and, in some cases, has caused whole industries to vanish); see also Carl Benedikt
Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?,
TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE, Jan. 2017, at 254, 265 (“According to our
estimate, 47% of total US employment is in the high risk [of being lost] category . . . .”); Stephanie
Clifford, U.S. Textile Plants Return, with Floors Largely Empty of People, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2013), https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/20/business/us-textile-factories-return.html
[ https://perma.cc/9AZQ-K6ZP ] (“And politicians’ promises that American manufacturing means an
abundance of new jobs is complicated—yes, it means jobs, but on nowhere near the scale there was
before, because machines have replaced humans at almost every point in the production process.”);
James Manyika, Michael Chui, Jacques Bughin, Richard Dobbs, Peter Bisson & Alex Marrs,
Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business, and the Global Economy,
MCKINSEY GLOBAL INST. (May 2013), http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digitalmckinsey/our-insights/disruptive-technologies [https://perma.cc/9GFM-E8RK ] (“Twelve
emerging technologies—including the mobile Internet, autonomous vehicles, and advanced
genomics—have the potential to truly reshape the world in which we live and work. Leaders in
both government and business must not only know what’s on the horizon but also start preparing for
its impact.”); John Markoff, Skilled Work, Without the Worker, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/business/new-wave-of-adept-robots-is-changing-globalindustry.html [ https://perma.cc/G5CK-QT4L ] (“A new wave of robots, far more adept than those
now commonly used by automakers and other heavy manufacturers, are replacing workers around the
world in both manufacturing and distribution.”); Samantha Masunaga, Robots Could Take Over
38% of U.S. Jobs Within About 15 Years, Report Says, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 2017, 11:20 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-pwc-robotics-jobs-20170324-story.html [ https://perma.cc/
5TER-XS7K ] (“More than a third of U.S. jobs could be at ‘high risk’ of automation by the early 2030s
. . . .”). Bear in mind that over half a century ago, technology was, even then, a perceived threat to the
job market. See The Automation Jobless: Not Fired, Just Not Hired, TIME (Feb. 24, 1961),
https://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,828815,00.html [ https://perma.cc/2UERGCEH ] .

Final to Print_Soled (Do Not Delete)

790

3/26/2019 9:33 AM

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 9:787

rather than from capital.8 If the current technological trend continues (and it shows
no signs of abating), tax revenues will necessarily diminish.9
To reverse this revenue trend, Congress should consider taxing capital more
heavily. But capital is often mobile (i.e., plant and machinery and, in particular,
intellectual property can readily be transported);10 that being the case, in a global
environment, if one country taxes capital too heavily, there is a tangible risk of
capital flight.11 In lieu of directly taxing the income that capital generates in the form
of higher capital gains tax rates, Congress should instead impose a more robust
estate tax. This makes sense for two reasons. First, unlike capital, for a whole host
of reasons (e.g., immigration issues, family connections, and work responsibilities),
taxpayers themselves cannot easily migrate and extricate themselves from high-tax
jurisdictions.12 Second, there is a moral fairness perspective; more specifically,
owners and sellers of capital who were able to capitalize upon preferential tax rates
on their gains during their lifetimes (in many cases bearing little or no tax) should,
at least at death, shoulder their equitable share of the nation’s tax burden.
A twenty-first-century estate tax targeted at capital should be broad-based and
its enforcement vigorous. Part II provides historical background of the estate tax
and the evolving dynamic between labor and capital in which the latter is eclipsing
the former in terms of workplace trends. Part III then details how Congress
currently taxes the income derived from labor and capital and why the status quo is
unsustainable. Next, Part IV explains how the estate tax can fulfill a new role,
namely, as a surrogate tax on capital income. Finally, Part V concludes.

8. Consider two facts: The first is that, over the last decade, the nation’s payroll
taxes generate nearly the same amount of revenue as the nation’s income tax. See, e.g., OFFICE
OF M GMT . & B UDGET , E XEC . O FFICE OF THE P RESIDENT , H ISTORICAL T ABLES , at
tbl.2.1 (2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/historical-tables/ [https://perma.cc/8P7QPTRR]. The second is that the amount of revenue collected on capital gains receipts constitute
only a small component of the income tax revenue collected. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY,
TAXES PAID ON LONG-TERM CAPITAL GAINS, 1977–2014 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/Documents/Taxes-Paid-on-Long-Term-CapitalGains.pdf [ https://perma.cc/L8KF-XZTR ].
9. See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, Automation and the Income Tax, 10
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1 (2019) (noting that if certain variables (e.g., economic growth and tax rates) are kept
constant, as labor’s role in the economy declines and that of capital increases, tax revenues will
necessarily decrease).
10. See, e.g., George R. Zodrow, Capital Mobility and Capital Tax Competition, 63 NAT’L. TAX
J. 865, 890 (2010) (“There is general agreement that capital is mobile and has become increasingly
mobile over time . . . .“).
11. See, e.g., Jasmine M. Fisher, Fairer Shores: Tax Havens, Tax Avoidance, and Corporate Social
Responsibility, 94 B.U. L. REV. 337 (2014) (explaining how capital flows (at least on paper) to tax
havens); Hedda Leikvang, Piercing the Veil of Secrecy: Securing Effective Exchange of Information to
Remedy the Harmful Effects of Tax Havens, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 293 (2012) (explaining the
nature of tax shelters and how they attract capital).
12. The Code provides that taxpayers who relinquish their citizenship must pay an exit tax,
which, in many cases, has the potential to be quite significant. I.R.C. § 877A (West 2018).
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BACKGROUND

When the United States instituted the Sixteenth Amendment to the
Constitution authorizing the income tax and three years later when the estate tax
came into being, the nation was undergoing a fundamental transformation from an
agrarian-based economy to an industrial-based economy.13 As this transformation
process unfolded, it resulted in a fundamental reorientation of the nation’s revenueraising mechanisms away from tariffs toward reliance upon an income tax.14
But since the institution of the income tax and the estate tax, the country has
experienced two significant economic transformations. First, during the course of
the twentieth century, the industrial era flourished as taxpayers and plant and
machinery coexisted, side-by-side, escalating productivity to new heights.15 Second,
during the twenty-first century, the technology era is flourishing, with automation
often replacing taxpayers at the workplace and productivity reaching even greater
heights.16 Notwithstanding the magnitude of these economic transformations, the
nation’s tax system largely subscribes to the same historical tenets as it has almost
since its inception in 1913, with labor income heavily taxed, trade and business
income moderately taxed, and capital gains either lightly taxed or exempted from
tax.17
In light of these significant economic transformations, Congress must
consider reforming the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) and, in particular, the
estate tax. Section A explores the heritage of the estate tax and where it stands today.
Next, Section B scrutinizes the relationship between the income tax and the estate
tax and how the Automation Era may be bringing them closer together.

13. See generally PAUL K. CONKIN, A REVOLUTION DOWN ON THE FARM (2008) (describing
the radical transformation of the U.S. farming system); BRUCE L. GARDNER, AMERICAN
AGRICULTURE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2002) (same).
14. See, e.g., Sheldon D. Pollack, Origins of the Modern Income Tax, 1894–1913, 66 TAX L. 295,
329 (2013) (“Within the context of the 19th century system of protective tariffs that imposed a
disproportionate share of the cost of government on laborers and farmers, a vote in Congress for an
income tax was invariably coupled with a vote for tariff reduction.”).
15. See generally DANIEL T. RODGERS, THE WORK ETHIC IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1850–
1920, at 27 (1978).
16. See Allan Collard-Wexler & Jan De Loecker, Reallocation and Technology: Evidence from the
US Steel Industry, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 131 (2015); Claire Cain Miller, The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is
Not China. It’s Automation, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/21/
upshot/the-long-term-jobs-killer-is-not-china-its-automation.html [ https://perma.cc/NEA7-AGEC ];
Michael Chui, James Manyika & Mehdi Miremadi, Where Machines Could Replace Humans—and Where
They Can’t (Yet), MCKINSEY QUARTERLY (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/
digital-mckinsey/our-insights/where-machines-could-replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet
[ https://perma.cc/YS58-KG3H ] ; MICHAEL J. HICKS & SRIKANT DEVARAJ, CTR. FOR BUS. &
ECON. RESEARCH, BALL STATE UNIV., THE MYTH AND THE REALITY OF MANUFACTURING IN
AMERICA (2015), https://projects.cberdata.org/reports/MfgReality.pdf [ https://perma.cc/5EF8L9WP ].
17. Soled & Thomas, supra note 9.
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A. Heritage of the Twentieth-Century Estate Tax
Estate taxes date back several millennia.18 In most industrial countries, the
global presence of estate taxes today is a living testament to their viability and
functionality.19
Insofar as the United States is concerned,20 there are several predecessors to
the current estate tax regime.21 None of these predecessor estate tax regimes,
however, remained extant for long; and in 1916, Congress constructed an entirely
new estate tax regime.22 Subsection 1 below explores the current estate tax’s origins
and objectives, and Subsection 2 examines why the current estate tax has largely
fallen out of political favor.

18. See 1 RANDOLPH E. PAUL, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 3 (1942) (noting there
is evidence that ancient Egypt imposed an estate tax as early as 700 B.C.); Louis Eisenstein, The Rise
and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REV. 223, 223 (1956) (tracing the origins of the estate tax as
far back as ancient Egypt and then to its later adoption by the Greeks and Romans).
19. See KENNETH SCHEVE & DAVID STASAVAGE, TAXING THE RICH: A HISTORY OF FISCAL
FAIRNESS IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE 93 (2016) (delineating those countries that have
retained their estate taxes); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-22-08, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS 3 (2008) (“Among the thirty OECD countries, only
the United States and the United Kingdom have estate and gift tax systems that tax the transferor on
gratuitous transfers during life and at death. The majority of OECD countries have inheritance taxes.”).
Admittedly, over the course of the last two decades, several countries have repealed their estate
taxes. See John C. Goodman, Why Do We Have a Death Tax?, FORBES (Apr. 27, 2015,
9:21 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johngoodman/2015/04/27/why-do-we-have-a-deathtax [ https://perma.cc/Q8BH-Y58E ] (“[I]t was the unfairness of tax avoidance opportunities that
persuaded Sweden . . . to abolish the estate tax about a decade ago. Austria, Canada, Hong Kong, India,
Israel, New Zealand, Norway, Russia and Singapore are some other countries that have abolished their
estate or inheritance taxes.”).
20. For an excellent exposition of the historical aspects of the nation’s estate tax, see Alicia
Lerud, Looking to the Past in Planning for the Future: Does the Modern Estate Tax Fit Within the Ideals
of the Founding Fathers?, 6 NEV. L.J. 516 (2005–2006).
21. In 1797, Congress passed the first estate tax in the form of a legacy tax. Act of July 6, 1797
(Stamp Act of 1797), ch. 11, 1 Stat. 527 (1797). The stated purpose of this tax was to raise revenue for
the nation’s navy. See Debra Rahmin Silberstein, A History of the Death Tax: A Source of Revenue, or a
Vehicle for Wealth Redistribution?, 17 PROB. & PROP. 58, 59 (2003). A few years later, in 1802, Congress
repealed this tax. Act of Apr. 6, 1802 (Repeal of Internal Tax Act), ch. 19, 2 Stat. 148 (1802). In 1862,
when Congress needed revenue to again fund the military, this time for the Civil War, it enacted another
estate tax. Act of July 1, 1862 (Revenue Act of 1862), ch. 119, 12 Stat. 432, 483 (1862). Like its
predecessor, this tax did not last long and was repealed in 1870. Act of July 14, 1870 (Internal Taxes,
Customs Duties Act of 1870), ch. 255, § 27, 16 Stat. 256, 269 (1870). Driven by yet another need to
fund military expenditures in 1898, Congress enacted an estate tax that was short-lived until its repeal
in 1902. Act of June 12, 1898 (War Revenue Act of 1898), ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448 (1898), repealed by Act
of Apr. 12, 1902 (War Revenue Repeal Act of 1902), Pub. L. No. 57-67, ch. 500, 32 Stat. 96 (1902).
22. Act of Sept. 8, 1916 (Revenue Act of 1916), Pub. L. No. 64-271, ch. 463, §§ 200–12, 39
Stat. 756, 777–80 (1916).
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1. The Origins and Objectives of the Current Estate Tax Regime
In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt set into motion the formation of the
current estate tax regime.23 In a speech, he called upon Congress to institute an
estate tax that would have the following key characteristic: “[A] progressive tax on
all fortunes beyond a certain amount either given in life or devised . . . to put it out
of the power of the owner of one of these enormous fortunes to hand on more
than a certain amount to any one individual.”24 Notwithstanding Roosevelt’s
speech, estate tax institution did not gain immediate political traction. Instead, it was
World War I’s advent, when trade tariff receipts precipitously dropped, that forced
Congress to search for alternative revenue-raising measures.25 The estate tax offered
possibilities that appeared attractive to fulfill not only needed revenue objectives
but also the social objective that Roosevelt had posited a decade earlier.26
The estate tax regime that Congress instituted in 1916 largely resembles the
estate tax regime that is still in place today. The tax base was (and still is) based on
the fair market value of the property owned by the decedent at the time of death.27
In addition, the tax base was (and still is) augmented by transfers for inadequate
consideration, transfers not intended to take effect until death, and transfers in
contemplation of death.28 Finally, the base included (and still does) the full value of
property owned concurrently by a decedent and another person (except to the
extent that the other person can prove contribution).29
In the twentieth century, the estate tax was a practical tax, designed to affect
social engineering while simultaneously being driven by financial necessity. In the
twenty-first century, this still remains the case; but since its enactment, not everyone
has shared this opinion. To the contrary, as explored in the next subsection, the
estate tax has endured a turbulent political history.
2. The Current Estate Tax Regime on the Brink of Repeal
The history of the estate tax has been marked by instability. Indeed, from its
initial inception to the present day, the estate tax has had little political respite. Even

23. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt, Seventh Annual Message to the Senate and House of
Representatives, Dec. 3, 1907, in 16 A COMPILATION OF THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS, 1789–1914, at 7070, 7083 (1908) (Roosevelt posited that a “graduated income tax of the
proper type would be a desirable feature of Federal taxation, and it is hoped that one may be devised
which the Supreme Court will declare constitutional.”).
24. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 88 (1954).
25. See JOHN R. LUCKEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-444, A HISTORY OF FEDERAL ESTATE,
GIFT, AND GENERATION-SKIPPING TAXES 6 (2001), https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/
metacrs1946/m1/1/high_res_d/95-444a_2001Aug09.pdf [ http://perma.cc/NUL7-NYD4 ] (“In
1916, Congress reacted to a mixture of changing attitudes and revenue shortages, the latter caused by a
reduction in United States trade tariff receipts in the early years of World War I.”).
26. See Eisenstein, supra note 18, at 228.
27. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 202(a); I.R.C. § 2033 (2012).
28. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 202(b); I.R.C. §§ 2035(a), 2037(a) (2012).
29. See Revenue Act of 1916 § 202(c); I.R.C. § 2040(a) (2012).
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at the time that Congress originally enacted the estate tax, its passage was greeted
with vehement opposition.30
Over the course of the ensuing decades, there have been repeated calls for
estate tax repeal.31 These demands for repeal have come from a variety of circles.
Sometimes they have emanated from conservatives who rail against all forms of
taxation;32 other times, they have originated from small business owners and
farmers who claim that the estate tax robs their offspring and other heirs of their
rightful inheritance;33 still other times, members of the academic community have
expressed deep misgivings toward the estate tax on the basis that it spurs wasteful
consumption.34
The calls for estate tax repeal have not gone unheard. Numerous public
opinion polls have routinely expressed tepidness with respect to estate tax
retention.35 This has been especially true since a Republican strategist gave the estate
tax its now-familiar moniker—death tax.36
Toward the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first
century, estate tax repeal calls became increasingly louder. Over this time period,
with each passing year, the number of times that congressional members submitted

30. For example, in a floor debate regarding estate tax enactment, Representative Charles Henry
Sloan complained that “[i]f [the Democrats] can not reduce the cost of living[,] they demonstrate to the
public their ability to raise the cost of dying.” 53 CONG. REC. 10,594 (1916).
31. Even as early as the 1920s (just a few years after estate tax enactment), President Coolidge
and his secretary of the Treasury, Andrew Mellon, sought estate tax repeal. Susan Murnane, Andrew
Mellon’s Unsuccessful Attempt to Repeal Estate Taxes, 108 TAX NOTES 1177 (2005); Coolidge Would
End Inheritance Taxes; Calls It State Field, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1925, at 1, 4.
32. See, e.g., N. Gregory Mankiw, Why Taxing Fairly Means Not Taxing Inheritances, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/11/upshot/why-taxing-fairly-means-not-taxinginheritances.html [ https://perma.cc/2LG9-HUP9 ] (advocating for estate tax elimination).
33. See, e.g., Mark Koba, Is the Death Tax Killing American Family Farms?, FORTUNE
(Apr. 13, 2015), https://fortune.com/2015/04/13/death-tax-killing-american-family-farms/
[ https://perma.cc/EJ4K-URF5 ] (citing to congressional testimony from farmers seeking estate tax
repeal).
34. See, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE
L.J. 283, 364 (1994) (“The estate tax penalizes the productive work and savings efforts of our wealthiest
citizens, while doing nothing about, indeed even inducing, their large-scale consumption of resources.”).
35. See, e.g., Am. Enter. Inst., AEI Releases Study on Public Opinion of Taxes, TAX NOTES
TODAY, Apr. 14, 2006, at 2 ¶ 10 (discussing various public opinion polls that depict the general
populace expressing tepid responses toward estate tax retention); see MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN
SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 122
(2005) (noting that polls in the late 1990s showed 70 percent support for estate tax repeal).
36. WILLIAM H. GATES SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR COMMONWEALTH: WHY
AMERICANS SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 57 (2002) (describing how James Martin,
founding member of the 60 Plus Association, coined this phrase).
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bills to repeal the estate tax has grown.37 However, as the repeal votes have become
more dominant,38 the estate tax has remained—albeit hanging on by a thread.
Even though the estate tax has yet to be repealed, it has largely been
emasculated. Proof of this abounds: (i) in its heyday during the 1970s, the estate tax
used to affect close to 7.65 percent of estates,39 but today this figure has dwindled
to an anemic 0.18 percent;40 (ii) the estate tax rate has plummeted from a high of 77
percent from 1942 to 197641 to where it stands today at 40 percent;42 (iii) the amount
taxpayers can shelter from estate tax is at historically high levels (in 2018,
$22,360,000 for married taxpayers and $11,180,000 for individual taxpayers);43 and
(iv) circumventions to transfer tax (e.g., fair market value manipulation) have gained
traction and have even been given tacit administrative endorsement.44 The estate
tax of yesterday is not the estate tax of today; it’s essentially a shell of its former self,
seriously hobbled and reduced to virtual obscurity.
B. The Income Tax and Its Relationship to the Estate Tax
On the surface, there is little that the income and estate taxes share in
common. The former taxes on an annual basis;45 the latter taxes on a one-time
basis.46 Furthermore, the former imposes a progressive rate structure based upon
family circumstances (e.g., married, single, and head of household);47 the latter
imposes a flat tax rate.48 Finally, the former includes as its base income;49 in contrast,
the latter utilizes net wealth as the appropriate tax metric.50

37. For an extensive discussion of congressional efforts to repeal the estate tax, see Daniel
W. Matthews, A Fight to the Death: Slaying the Estate Tax Repeal Hydra, 28 WHITTIER L. REV. 663
(2006); see also Michael J. Graetz, “Death Tax” Politics, 57 B.C. L. REV. 801 (2016).
38. Peter Baker, House Votes to Repeal Estate Tax, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/us/politics/house-votes-to-repeal-estate-tax.html
[ https://perma.cc/S7WA-R3B7 ].
39. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., STATISTICS OF INCOME BULLETIN HISTORICAL TABLE 17,
https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-historical-table-17 [ https://perma.cc/3PKU-BPGR ] (follow
“Historical Table 17” hyperlink); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCX-52-15, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 25 (2015).
40. JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 39, at 1.
41. See Darien B. Jacobson, Brian G. Raub & Barry W. Johnson, The Estate Tax: Ninety
Years and Counting, STAT. INCOME BULL. 118, 122, 125 (2007), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/
ninetyestate.pdf [ https://perma.cc/X8JG-BYM2 ] (providing data on estate tax exemptions and tax
rates since 1916).
42. I.R.C. § 2001(c) (2012).
43. Id. § 2010(c).
44. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202, 1993 IRB LEXIS 84 (sanctioning taxpayers’ use
of minority and marketability discounts).
45. I.R.C. § 441(a), (b) (2012).
46. Id. § 2031(a).
47. Id. § 1(a)–(d).
48. Id. § 2001(c).
49. Id. § 63(a).
50. Id. § 2051.
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Notwithstanding these seemingly vast differences, the estate and income taxes
are tangentially related. By way of background, Subsection 1 examines how the Code
identifies income sources and taxes them differently. Next, Subsection 2 explains
how these income tax source rate differentials, in the Automation Era, possibly bind
the income and estate taxes closer together.
1. Income Sources and Their Tax Consequences
Under the Code, the starting point for taxing income is marked by eloquent
simplicity: all wealth accretions, no matter what their source, are defined to be
income.51 Thus, when Congress enacted the income tax,52 ignoring the deemed
realization requirement, the identical fate befell all annual wealth accretions.53
But this similarity in treatment did not last long. In the early 1920s, there were
cries that the economy needed to be spurred and that a capital gains tax reduction
would help achieve this objective.54 Furthermore, a leading corporate attorney,
Fredrick R. Kellogg, offered compelling congressional testimony that a reduced
capital gains rate would unlock taxpayers’ hesitations to realize capital appreciation
and thereby enhance revenue flow to the federal government’s coffers.55 Couple
these arguments with the fact that many of the country’s European counterparts
either subjected capital gains to lower tax rates or exempted them entirely
from tax,56 and it was not long before Congress instituted a tax rate preference for
capital gains.57
Ever since, the capital gains preference has been one of the Code’s hallmark
features.58 Indeed, only once in the past hundred years, during a brief time interval
immediately following the passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, did the Code tax

51. Id. § 61(a).
52. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166, 169 (1913).
53. See Van Mayhall, Capital Gains Taxation—The First One Hundred Years, 41 LA. L. REV. 81,
87 (1980) (“As a result of [several Supreme Court decisions] interpreting the sixteenth amendment, the
Revenue Acts, from 1913 through 1921, taxed capital gains in the same manner as any other income.
Gains were included with other income and were subject to both a normal tax and a surtax at the full
rates under the then-existing tax structure.”).
54. See Ajay K. Mehrotra & Julia C. Ott, The Curious Beginnings of the Capital Gains Tax
Preference, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2517, 2524 (2016) (“Faced with a mild post-war recession, and
prevailing high marginal rates, business leaders and economic commentators protested that the elevated
wartime rates were no longer necessary.”).
55. Internal-Revenue Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, on the
Proposed Revenue Act of 1921, 67th Cong. 534–54 (1921) (statement of Frederick R. Kellogg).
56. See Calvin H. Johnson, Taxing the Consumption of Capital Gains, 28 VA. TAX REV. 477, 488
(2009) (“Capital gain was originally excluded from the British income tax when the first general income
tax was adopted in 1799 under the presumption that capital gains were allocated to capital or investment
and were not available for consumption.”); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Origins of Capital Gains
Taxation: What’s Law Got to Do with It?, 39 SW. L.J. 869, 894–96 (explaining how British law
historically did not tax capital gains).
57. Income Tax Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 206, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
58. See, e.g., Deborah H. Schenk, Foreword, 48 TAX L. REV. 315, 315 (1993) (“A tax preference
for capital gains is an idea with remarkable staying power.”).
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capital gains and ordinary income at the same tax rates.59 Otherwise, the capital
gains tax rate preference has reigned supreme, and its significance has been
immense: capital gains have generally been taxed at one-half the tax rate applicable
to ordinary income, and sometimes this tax rate disparity has been even greater.60
Aside from the tax rate preference, in certain instances, the Code permits capital
gains to be deferred61 and, in other instances, even exempts such gains entirely from
tax.62
While the history of capital gains taxation depicts its favorable tax treatment,
the exact opposite is true with respect to the income that labor generates. During
the early 1930s, as part of the New Deal, President Roosevelt decided to initiate a
retirement safety net and created a Committee on Economic Security to study the
issue.63 On the basis of this committee’s report, Roosevelt and Congress decided to
act. As a place to tap for financial resources, they selected labor income.64 Congress
therefore enacted new payroll taxes on the salaries and wages that employees
received and the wages and salaries that employers paid; in addition, a selfemployment equivalent tax was imposed.65 Using the success of the Social Security
system as a model, President Johnson and Congress decided during the 1960s to
institute what has commonly been referred to as the “Great Society.”66 As part of
this plan, Congress would provide medical insurance for the elderly and needy; and,
as a funding mechanism, it once again chose to tax labor income, introducing
another payroll burden.67

59. See J. Andrew Hoerner, Why Can’t America Get the Capital Gains Tax Right?, 54 TAX
NOTES 893, 896 (1992) (noting that following the Tax Reform Act of 1986, the capital gains preference
was eliminated; however, in 1991, Congress raised ordinary income tax rates but maintained the lower
tax rates for capital gains).
60. For an excellent historic exposition of capital gains tax rates, see John W. Lee III,
The Capital Gains “Sieve” and the “Farce” of Progressivity 1921–1986, 1 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 1 (2005).
61. I.R.C. § 1031(a) (2011).
62. See id. § 121(a) (for married couples, exempting the first $500,000 of gains on the sale of a
personal residence from tax); id. § 1202(a) (exempting the gains on the sale of certain small business
stock).
63. See The Committee on Economic Security (CES), SOCIAL SECURITY, https://www.ssa.gov/
history/reports/ces/cesbasic.html [https://perma.cc/2LU2-DWMT ] ( last visited Feb. 2, 2019 ).
64. See Patricia E. Dilley, Taking Public Rights Private: The Rhetoric and Reality of Social Security
Privatization, 41 B.C. L. REV. 975, 1031 (“[T]he financing mechanism of the program was tied so closely
to the benefit entitlement structure that benefits were advertised as being paid for by the workers who
were earning them and paying FICA taxes along with their employers.”).
65. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER JR., THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 308–09 (1958)
(quoting Roosevelt: “We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal,
moral, and political right to collect their pensions and their unemployment benefits. With those taxes
in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program.”); see also JOHN A. BRITTAIN,
THE PAYROLL TAX FOR SOCIAL SECURITY 6–9 (1972).
66. RANDALL B. WOODS, PRISONERS OF HOPE: LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE GREAT
SOCIETY, AND THE LIMITS OF LIBERALISM 157–82 (2016); NANCY A. COLBERT, GREAT SOCIETY:
THE STORY OF LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON 99–101 (2002).
67. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286, 361–413 (1965).
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These historical incidents have left their indelible mark on the Code. Over the
course of the past half century, the income derived from capital has been lightly
taxed, business and trade profits moderately taxed,68 and labor income heavily
taxed. Consider a simple fact pattern that affirms this assertion. In 2018, assume
married Taxpayer A experiences a $100,000 capital gain, married Taxpayer B earns
$100,000 of business profits, and married Taxpayer C makes a $100,000 salary.
Although each taxpayer secures $100,000 of pretax income, the tax burden that
befalls each would be vastly different: in terms of taxes, Taxpayer A would owe
$18,300;69 Taxpayer B would owe $18,289.50;70 and Taxpayer C would owe
$33,589.50.71
2. Drawing a Connection Between the Income and Estate Taxes
As previously stated,72 the income and estate taxes share no outward
similarities. In light of their differences (or, perhaps, simply due to historical
happenstance), the income tax is set forth in Chapter 1 of the Code,73 and, separated
by multiple chapters, the estate tax is set forth in Chapter 11 of the Code.74
There is also judicial affirmation that the income and estate taxes are not
interconnected. Courts routinely state that the income and estate taxes should not
be construed to be in pari materia.75 The takeaway from these judicial adjudications
is clear: since the focus of the income tax is upon annual wealth accretions76 and
the focus of the estate tax is on overall net worth at death,77 they should not be read
in a way that is necessarily consistent or complementary.
But over the course of the last century, connections between the income and
estate taxes have been drawn. From an academic perspective, Columbia law

68. Note that the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11011(a), 131 Stat. 2054,
provides for a 20 percent deduction for “pass-through income,” which lowers the effective tax rate for
qualifying taxpayers earning income from sole proprietorships and pass-through entities, such as S
corporations and limited liability companies. I.R.C. § 199A (West 2018).
69. See I.R.C. § 1(h) (2018) (levying a 15 percent capital gains tax); id. § 1411(a) (levying a 3.8
percent net investment income tax).
70. Id. § 1(a). If the taxpayer earned this income vis-à-vis a pass-through entity, a special passthrough deduction might be applicable. See supra note 68.
71. Under this set of assumptions, Taxpayer C would directly and indirectly incur $15,300 of
payroll taxes (7.65 percent payroll tax levied directly on Taxpayer C’s earnings, I.R.C. § 3101(a), (b)
(West 2018)) and 7.65 percent payroll tax levied on Taxpayer C’s employer (I.R.C. § 3111(a), (b) (2018)).
In addition, Taxpayer C would bear $18,289.50 of income tax under I.R.C. § 1(a) (West 2018).
72. See supra notes 45–50 and accompanying text.
73. I.R.C. §§ 1 to 1400Z-2 (2018).
74. Id. §§ 2001–209.
75. Compare, e.g., Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm’r, 160 F.2d 812, 814 (7th Cir. 1947) (“In our
opinion the income tax provisions are not to be construed as though they were in pari materia with
either the estate tax law or the gift tax statutes.”), with Estate of Sanford v. Comm’r, 308 U.S. 39, 44
(1939) (“The gift tax was supplementary to the estate tax. The two are in pari materia and must be
construed together.”).
76. See I.R.C. § 61(a) (2017) (defining gross income).
77. See id. § 2031(a) (defining gross estate).
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professor Michael Graetz has argued that the estate tax functions as a de facto
“backstop” to ensure that the income tax system is equitable.78 In support of his
position, Professor Graetz cites to the income tax rule that permits the adjusted tax
bases of a decedent’s assets to equal their fair market value (e.g., for Apple stock
that a taxpayer purchased at $100 per share and, at the date of death, is trading at
$1,000 per share, the Code accords the latter as its tax basis in the recipient’s
hands).79 This “tax basis equals fair market value” rule at the date of death enables
the appreciated dollar amount to escape the income tax base and costs the Treasury
Department billions of dollars annually.80 Estate tax imposition attempts to
compensate for this revenue leakage but does so imperfectly.81
Professor Graetz is not alone is drawing such connections. Politicians
routinely treat the income and estate taxes as being interconnected. Consider the
fact that over the last several decades, a common political rallying cry has been that
estate tax imposition constitutes a double tax on the same income and, as such, is
wholly unfair.82 The “double tax” critique is not entirely without legitimacy.
When distilled down to its essentials, the mainstay of most people’s estates
is essentially an amalgamation of their after-tax incomes, which, by definition,
have already been subject to tax.83 The estate tax thus constitutes another burden
levied upon the same income.
Or does it? Due to the automation trend (discussed in more detail in the next
Part), the answer to this question remains open to debate. As a general proposition,
as the income derived from capital gradually becomes more pervasive and the
income derived from labor wanes,84 a greater proportion of taxpayers’ incomes
(particularly, the incomes of those who are wealthy) is being taxed lightly or not at
all.85 As a result, estate tax imposition may be the only tax that the Code levies (or,
78. Graetz, supra note 2, at 271–73.
79. I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2017).
80. See U.S. T REASURY D EP ’T , T AX E XPENDITURES 1, 23 tbl.1 (2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-Expenditures-FY2018.pdf
[ https:// perma.cc/B3JN-GWCT ] (estimating billions of dollars of annual revenue loss).
81. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., DESCRIPTION AND
ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEMS 1–2 (2008), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=showdown&id=1318 [ https://perma.cc/YRR4-5G5Z ] (“[T]ransfer taxes
sometimes are thought to serve as an important backstop to an income tax system, potentially capturing
and taxing certain accrued income that ‘leaks’ through the income tax system.”); Graetz, supra note 2,
at 270–73 (“[The estate tax] provid[es] an important element of progressivity in the federal tax
system.”).
82. See, e.g., Edmund L. Andrews, Death Tax? Double Tax? For Most, It’s No Tax, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 14, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/14/business/yourmoney/death-tax-doubletax-for-most-its-no-tax.html [ https://perma.cc/W56Q-PSCP ] (“And while opponents contend that
the estate tax is a ‘double tax,’ . . .”). And, as evidenced by the estate tax’s low approval ratings, see supra
note 35 and accompanying text, this critique appears to have resonated with large swaths of the public.
83. All accretions to wealth are supposed to be taxed. I.R.C. § 61(a) (West 2017). There are,
admittedly, many exceptions to this general rule set forth in Part III of Subchapter B of Chapter 1 of
the Code. See id. § 101 et seq.
84. See infra Section III.B.
85. See infra Section III.C.
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if it is a second tax, it simply compensates for the initially lighter tax burden that
befalls capital income). Framed in this fashion, going forward, the income and estate
taxes may operate symbiotically to ensure that all taxpayers bear their fair share of
the nation’s tax burden.
II. THE AUTOMATION ERA AND THE LABOR/CAPITAL DYNAMIC
When it comes to what potentially lies in the future, the founder of Tesla
Motors, Elon Musk, paints a dire picture. When the Automation Era hits full stride,
according to Musk, the country will be a scene of dystopia, where the vast majority
of people have no jobs or sources of income—and, as a result, anarchy may reign.86
While Musk does not describe the tax consequences associated with the Automation
Era, left unchecked, they may be bleak as well.
In the subsections below, the tax implications associated with the Automation
Era are explored. First, Section A describes the Automation Era’s technological
changes that curtail or eliminate the need for labor. Next, Section B summarizes the
consequences associated with labor’s diminishment. Based upon these potential
consequences, Section C then sets forth the case for a meaningful estate tax.
A. Technological Changes That Curtail or Eliminate Labor
Technology and automation are rapidly transforming the economic landscape.
Tasks that were once labor-intensive (e.g., harvesting a wheat field) and took
hundreds or thousands of labor hours can now be achieved through automation
that engenders few labor hours and, in some cases, is completely automated.87
From every economic sector, evidence for the depth of this transformation
process abounds. In the area of housing, for example, prefabricated housing is
increasingly in vogue.88 In the area of agriculture, a whole new range of specialized

86. Dom Galeon, Elon Musk: Automation Will Force Governments to Introduce Universal Basic
Income, FUTURISM (Feb. 14 2017), https://futurism.com/elon-musk-automation-will-forcegovernments-to-introduce-universal-basic-income/ [ https://perma.cc/6ESZ-XE96 ].
87. See, e.g., Michael Morgenstern, Automation and Anxiety, ECONOMIST ( June
25, 2016), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2016/06/25/automation-and-anxiety
[ https://perma.cc/QX66-GFLQ ] (“In previous waves of automation, workers had the option of
moving from routine jobs in one industry to routine jobs in another; but now the same ‘big data’
techniques that allow companies to improve their marketing and customer-service operations also give
them the raw material to train machine-learning systems to perform the jobs of more and more
people.”).
88. See Pooja Bhatia, From Factory to Home: Prefab Is Having a Moment, USA TODAY
( July 23, 2014, 10:42 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2014/07/23/ozyprefab-houses/12986815 [ https://perma.cc/PK99-KG9X ]; Peter Gössel, Arnt Cobbers
& Oliver Jahn, A Brief History of Prefab, ARCHITECTURE WK. (Oct. 3, 2012),
https://www.architectureweek.com/2012/1003/design_1-1.html [ https://perma.cc/MS25-DSJN ].
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tools can harvest entire fields89 and even milk cows.90 Finally, in the general area of
manufacturing, innovation has sparked production.91 And there is every indication
that the economic landscape’s transformation process will continue unabated.92
For the time being, notwithstanding these vast economic changes, the labor
market has remained somewhat nimble. When, for example, work disappeared from
farms and ranches,93 the nation’s labor force shifted to manufacturing.94 When
manufacturing jobs began to diminish, the nation’s labor force gravitated toward
the service sector.95 Even as service-sector jobs have somewhat dried up, new
positions in the sphere of technology have arisen.96

89. See Japanese Robot Can Pick Strawberry Fields Forever for Farmer, JAPAN
TIMES (Sept. 26, 2013, 12:38 AM), https://www.news.com.au/technology/science/japanese-robotcan-pick-strawberry-fields-forever-for-farmer/news-story/48111ca9c51f012fd4bce90bd58229ee
[ https://perma.cc/4VCB-HR6H ]. (“This robot would harvest two-thirds of strawberries during the
night when growers are sleeping.”).
90. See Kaleigh Rogers, Robots Are Milking Cows for Dairy, Data, MOTHERBOARD (Feb. 26,
2015, 1:30 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/robots-are-milking-cows-for-dairydata [ https://perma.cc/2FRP-97X6 ] (“Milking has been semi-automated for decades now, but it still
requires a human to corral the animals, clean the cows’ udders, and hook up and detach the milking
machine. Robotic milkers eliminate the need for human intervention: it’s just animal and machine.”).
91. See Darrell M. West, How Technology Is Changing Manufacturing, BROOKINGS
( June 2, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2016/06/02/how-technology-ischanging-manufacturing [ https://perma.cc/4XXB-NVD9 ] (“Workers now are producing 47 percent
more than 20 years ago. Through the development of automation, robotics, and advanced
manufacturing, the sector has bounced back along with the overall economy.”).
92. See, e.g., Ashish Deshpande, Global 2018 Trends That Will Influence Business Automation,
FORBES (Mar. 7, 2018, 8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/03/
07/global-2018-trends-that-will-influence-business-automation
[ https://perma.cc/69SHM3CK ] (“Automating everyday business processes and workflows has become hugely important in
2018 as many companies realize that manual processes may not cut it in a world where they must act
with unprecedented speed to meet customer needs, improve and innovate continuously to compete
and analyze critical information.”).
93. See, e.g., Donald M. Fisk, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Labor in the 20th Century,
MONTHLY LAB. REV. ( 2003), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/cwc/american-labor-in-the-20thcentury.pdf [ https://perma.cc/33YG-KBFV ] (“At the turn of the [twentieth] century, about 38
percent of the labor force worked on farms. By the end of the century, that figure was less than 3
percent.”).
94. See, e.g., Jonathan Rees, Industrialization and Urbanization in the United
HIST. (July
2016),
States, 1880–1929, OXFORD RES. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AM.
https://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore9780199329175-e-327 [ https://perma.cc/Q38J-VJNS ] (“Between 1880 and 1929, industrialization and
urbanization expanded in the United States faster than ever before.”).
95. The service industry grew from 31 percent of all workers in 1900, U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, at 138, 152–
66 (1975), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial1970/hist_stats_colonial-1970p1-chD.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HVW-ACKJ], to 78 percent in 1999,
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2000, at 410 tbl.656, 426
tbl.682 (2000), https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2000/compendia/statab/120ed.html
[ https://perma.cc/U4G5-PC2G ].
96. See generally Jon Swartz, Tech Jobs Are Thriving Nationwide—Up to 7.3M, USA TODAY
(Apr. 3, 2017, 12:03 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/talkingtech/2017/04/03/techjobs-thriving-nationwide——up-73m/99789502/ [ https://perma.cc/3HSC-THLU ].
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The unanswered question is whether the country is heading toward a critical
breaking point in which many jobs and whole industries will disappear and will not
be replaced by new ones. To date, the unemployment rate has remained fairly low.97
Nevertheless, many economists predict this will not remain the case, insisting that
the unemployment rate is likely to rise precipitously.98 The reasons for economic
pessimism are well-founded. Technological advancements are proceeding at a rapid
pace, and these advancements can readily produce robots and machinery that can
unceremoniously eradicate virtually any menial position and, in some cases, even
those jobs that require special skills and expertise.99
While the future is hard to predict, labor’s prospects are dim. To find positions
and to remain employed, taxpayers will have to educate and retrain themselves on
a constant basis.100 Those who do otherwise are at grave risk of joining the
unemployment rolls. Virtually every economist draws the following inescapable
conclusion: in the future, less, rather than more, labor will likely be needed.101
B. Consequences Associated with Labor Income’s Diminishment
For the income tax system, the implications associated with labor’s
diminishment are vast. In a nutshell, this transformation (1) jeopardizes income tax
collections and (2) widens wealth disparities. Consider the severity of each.
1.

Income Tax Collections

There is no secret that the federal government collects most of its revenue via
the income tax.102 What is also clear is that when income tax receipts are broken
down by category, tax revenues derived from payroll tax receipts are far in excess
of those derived from capital gains.103 As reflected in Appendix A, this has been the
case for many decades, and, at least in the near term, there exist no estimates or
97. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—OCTOBER
2018 (2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit.pdf [ https://perma.cc/UHQ7-DQ6F] .
(indicating that the nation’s unemployment rate was 3.7 percent).
98. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
100. See Ryan Wibberley, Growth of AI Means We Need to Retrain Workers . . . Now, FORBES
(Feb. 28, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ryanwibberley/2017/02/28/growth-of-aimeans-we-need-to-retrain-workers-now [ https://perma.cc/Q9WX-B3FQ ].
101. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
102. Over 80 percent of the nation’s revenue comes from a combination of income and payroll
taxes (for fiscal year 2017, individual income taxes raised 47.9 percent and social insurance (payroll)
taxes raised 35.0 percent, respectively, of the nation’s revenue). See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
HISTORICAL TABLES 34 tbl.2.2 (Fiscal Year 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2018/02/hist-fy2019.pdf [ https://perma.cc/UVY6-8CXR ].
103. In 2014 (the last year data was available), payroll taxes generated just over a trillion dollars
of revenue, see id. at 33 tbl.2.1; by contrast, capital gains generated $139 billion of revenue. OFFICE OF
TAX ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAXES PAID ON CAPITAL GAINS FOR RETURNS WITH
POSITIVE NET CAPITAL INCOMES, 1954–2014 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/
tax-policy/tax-analysis/documents/taxes-paid-on-capital-gains-for-returns-with-positive-net-capitalgains.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B5M2-4WPX ].
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projections that indicate that the tax receipts’ ratio of labor income to capital income
will significantly vary.
But as the Automation Era shifts into full gear and the nation undergoes a
fundamental economic transformation, there is every reason to believe that the
income derived from labor (income and payroll tax receipts) will wane as the income
from capital grows in prominence. Assuming that this is the case, receipts from
labor will necessarily decline, and, by contrast, revenues from capital will increase.
Yet because of tax rate differentials,104 the outcome will not be symmetrical (the
revenue gains from capital will not equal the revenue loss from labor). To illustrate,
assuming that the effective tax rate on labor income is 40 percent and the rate on
capital gains is 15 percent, for every $100 billion drop in labor income and $100
billion increase in capital gains, the government stands to lose $25 billion (i.e., [0.40
x $100 billion] – [0.15 x $100 billion]) of tax revenue.
While the relationship between labor’s decline and capital’s rise is easy to
identify, what is far less certain is exactly how much potential revenue loss is at
stake. There are many factors to consider, including the speed at which technology
eradicates jobs, labor’s ability to transform itself to make itself useful, and the ways
in which the government responds with policy reforms (e.g., promotion of
educational opportunities). However, if there were a 10 percent decline in payroll
tax receipts and a corresponding 10 percent increase in capital gains tax receipts, the
anticipated revenue loss associated with this change would be over $90 billion.105
Anticipated revenue losses akin to the dollar figure just projected cannot be
blithely ignored. With annual tax receipts in the $3.27 trillion range (for 2016),106
the absence of $90 billion would put pressure on elected officials to consider four
difficult choices: (i) raising taxes, (ii) curtailing public expenditures, (iii) incurring
deeper deficits, or (iv) engaging in a combination of the foregoing. None of the
four foregoing options is particularly attractive. However, along with other
measures (e.g., tax simplification), the introduction of a reimagined estate tax should
be high on the consideration list.
2.

Wider Wealth Disparities

In the United States, over the course of time, wealth disparities have been
commonplace. Such disparities have existed at key time epochs, extending from the
time of colonial America to the Civil War and beyond the Great Depression.107

104. Compare I.R.C. § 1(c) (2018) (the highest tax rate for unmarried individuals is currently 37
percent), with id. § 1(h) (the highest capital gains tax rate is currently 20 percent).
105. Compare I.R.C. § 1(c) (2018) (the highest tax rate for unmarried individuals is currently 37
percent), with id. § 1(h) (the highest capital gains tax rate is currently 20 percent).
106. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 102.
107. J. Bradford DeLong, A History of Bequests in the United States, in DEATH AND
$S: THE ROLE OF GIFTS AND BEQUESTS IN AMERICA 33, 49 (Alicia H. Munnell & Annika
Sundén eds., Brookings Institution Press 2003) (from 1774 to 1900, the total wealth in the hands of the
richest 1 percent of taxpayers rose dramatically).
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And the presence of these wealth disparities has even helped define the cultural
landscape in books (e.g., John Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath), plays (e.g., Stephen
Karam’s The Humans), and movies (e.g., Oliver Stone’s Wall Street).
To curtail wealth disparities, Congress’s attitude has not been laissez-faire. To
the contrary, Congress has instituted a wide array of legislative measures designed
to ameliorate wealth disparities. Such measures include, but are not limited to, (i) a
social welfare program to ensure retirement income for all who participated in the
nation’s labor force and disability income for those workers who are disabled,108 (ii)
a comprehensive income tax system with a progressive rate structure so that those
earning more contribute a greater absolute dollar amount to the federal coffers,109
and (iii) an assortment of antitrust laws (e.g., the Sherman Antitrust Act, Clayton
Antitrust Act, and Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act) so that power and
wealth do not become monopolized in the hands of only a few.110
Despite the institution of these legislative measures, wealth disparities have
stubbornly remained part of the socioeconomic landscape. Statistics and empirical
studies support this proposition. At the start of the twenty-first century, those who
were in the upper 20 percent net worth category commanded approximately
93 percent of the nation’s assets; conversely, those who were in the bottom 80
percent net worth category commanded a meager 7 percent of the nation’s assets.111
The Gini coefficient—a measure connected with asset ownership that calibrates
wealth inequality—is also telling. A Gini coefficient of 0 indicates perfect equality
(i.e., every citizen having identical net worth), and a Gini coefficient of 100 indicates
perfect inequality (i.e., one citizen owning all of a nation’s wealth).112 A recent report
indicates that the United States has the greatest wealth inequality worldwide, with a
Gini coefficient score of 80.56.113
While the United States has never fared too well in terms of wealth inequality,
the nation’s wealth disparities are poised to worsen as automation becomes
increasingly dominant. Financial wherewithal appears to be concentrated in the

108. See generally Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397f (1988)); STAFF OF H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 104TH
CONG., 2D SESS., 1996 GREEN BOOK: BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 1–115 (Comm. Print 1996).
109. I.R.C. § 1(a)–(e) (2018).
110. See generally 15 U.S.C.
111. Deborah L. Jacobs, Occupy Wall Street and the Rhetoric of Equality, FORBES (Nov. 1, 2011,
11:40 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/deborahljacobs/2011/11/01/occupy-wall-street-and-therhetoric-of-equality/#426b530d1b88 [ https://perma.cc/9WSF-2R4N ]; see also CHARLES E. HURST,
SOCIAL INEQUALITY: FORMS, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 34 (2007) (in 2007, the top 20 percent
of the wealthiest possessed 80 percent of all financial assets).
112. See generally Gini Coefficient, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gini_coefficient
[ https://perma.cc/URN4-T7GN ] ( last visited Feb. 2, 2019 ).
113. ALLIANZ’S GLOBAL WEALTH REPORT 52 (2015), https://www.allianz.com/content/
dam/onemarketing/azcom/Allianz_com/migration/media/economic_research/publications/special
s/en/AGWR2015_ENG.pdf [ https://perma.cc/F4X2-2PG7 ].
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hands of those who comprise the top 1 percent of wealth owners.114 In fact, wealth
concentrations actually appear to be largely in the hands of those at the very, very
top of the financial pyramid.115
And the really troublesome aspect of U.S. wealth concentration is that it is
dominated by capital asset ownership. Put differently, those taxpayers who
comprise the upper tiers of net worth have assets that are primarily capital in nature,
such as equities, real estate, and plant and equipment; by extension, these taxpayers
do not own vast amounts of cash, inventory, or accounts receivable.116 As the
twenty-first century progresses, automation seems to put those who own the tools
of production in a position to exploit this technology to their financial benefit and
to the financial detriment of nonowners.117 Thus, given the nature of asset
ownership among those taxpayers who are the holders of great wealth in the United
States, coupled with the Code’s orientation to afford preferential tax treatment to
such assets, there is every reason to suspect that wealth disparities in the United
States will, absent reform, worsen.
C. The Need to Tax Capital More Heavily
Based upon the foregoing discussion, in an era marked by automation, there
is clearly a need for meaningful tax reform. The unanswered question is what form
it should take.
Some tax reform ideas are not viable. Taxing labor income more heavily, for
example, doesn’t appear to be a satisfactory solution because it is already heavily
taxed, and additional burdens on labor income may further dissuade its use. And if
Congress seeks to tax capital too heavily, one of two things can happen: (i) given
capital’s mobility (combined with the globalization of the world’s economic

114. See, e.g., Thomas Piketty et al., Distributional National Accounts, Methods and Estimates for
the United States, 133 Q. J. ECON. 553, 553-57 (“Income has boomed at the top[:] . . . [i]n 1980, top 1%
adults earned on average 27 times more than bottom 50% adults, while they earn 81 times more
today.”).
115. See, e.g., Larry Elliott, World’s Eight Richest People Have Same Wealth as Poorest 50%,
GUARDIAN ( Jan. 15, 2017, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2017/jan/
16/worlds-eight-richest-people-have-same-wealth-as-poorest-50 [ https://perma.cc/ZQD4-XRTP ]
(detailing an Oxfam report indicating that eight people (six of whom are from the United States) own
as much wealth as 50 percent of the world’s population).
116. See U.S. CENSUS, WEALTH ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND DEBT OF HOUSEHOLDS DETAILED
TABLES (2013) (Household Net Worth: $500,000 and Over), https://www.census.gov/data/
tables/2013/demo/wealth/wealth-asset-ownership.html [ https://perma.cc/K62S-NE5Z ] (depicting
the fact that large proportions of the wealth of high-net-worth taxpayers are comprised of capital asset
ownership); Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household Wealth in the United States: Rising Debt and
the Middle-Class Squeeze—An Update to 2007 17 (Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll., Working Paper
No. 589, 2010), http://www.levyinstitute.org/pubs/wp_589.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B78A-7RK7 ]
(“[After the top richest one percent of households, among the next nineteen percent], [f]orty-four
percent of their assets took the form of investment assets—real estate, business equity, stocks, and
bonds—and 19 percent was in the form of stocks directly or indirectly owned.”).
117. See Piketty et al., supra note 114, at 4 (“[W]e find that the upsurge of top incomes has
mostly been a capital-driven phenomenon since the late 1990s.”).
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marketplace), it may result in the flight of capital to other countries;118 and/or (ii) it
may exacerbate the so-called lock-in effect, whereby taxpayers retain their current
investments rather than selling them and only reinvest their diminished after-tax
proceeds.119
While the path to satisfactory tax reform is thus unclear, one potentially
palatable solution would be the congressional imposition of a meaningful estate tax
that functions as a deferred capital tax. Consider the plight of two taxpayers, Rich
and Penny, who each earns $100,000 annually. However, Rich earns this income as
a result of capital gains, and Penny earns her income in the form of salary payments.
As a result of taxes, Rich nets $85,000 and Penny $60,000 (the income of the former
enduring a 15 percent effective tax rate, and the income of the latter enduring a 40
percent effective tax rate).120 To meet their living and family expenses, assume
further that Rich and Penny each annually spend $60,000. In terms of after-tax
savings, this leaves Rich with $25,000 and Penny with nothing. Finally, assume that
for the next forty years this earnings, spending, and savings pattern continues and
that both taxpayers then suddenly perish. Notwithstanding the fact that both
taxpayers earned identical incomes, Rich will have a $1 million estate (($85,000 –
$60,000) x 40), and Penny will have a $0 estate (($60,000 – $60,000) x 40). To be
fair and equitable to both taxpayers, estate tax imposition on Rich’s estate thus
appears to make a lot of sense.
The foregoing argument in favor of estate tax imposition, needless to say,
would not resonate with everyone. To the contrary, estate tax naysayers would likely
posit three counterarguments.
First, estate tax naysayers would point to those taxpayers whose robust
incomes and related savings are a product of their own labor. Penny, they would
claim, could easily receive a sizable salary increase and earn $141,667, an amount
whose after-tax income would thus be equal to Rich’s after-tax income of $85,000
(i.e., $141,667 – ($141,667 x .4)), presuming that their annual spending habits are
the same (i.e., $60,000). This would leave Rich and Penny in the same economic
positions and both with the identical net $1 million estate. However, in the case of
Penny (and other similarly situated taxpayers) in such a scenario, estate tax
imposition would result in a hefty double tax.
118. See supra note 10.
119. See generally Charles C. Holt & John P. Shelton, The Lock-In Effect of the Capital Gains
Tax, 15 NAT’L TAX J. 337 (1962). There is a considerable literature on the effect of tax rate changes on
realization rates. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW CAPITAL GAINS TAX RATES AFFECT REVENUES:
THE HISTORICAL EVIDENCE (1988), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/
84xx/doc8449/88-cbo-007.pdf [ https://perma.cc/87RC-Y2Y8 ]; CONG. BUDGET OFFICE,
PERSPECTIVES ON THE OWNERSHIP OF CAPITAL ASSETS AND THE REALIZATION OF CAPITAL GAINS
(1997), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/105th-congress-1997-1998/reports/capgains.pdf
[ https://perma.cc/AWF9-PYTD ]; Jane G. Gravelle, Can a Capital Gains Tax Cut Pay for Itself?, 48
TAX NOTES 209 (1990); J. Andrew Hoerner, Treasury’s Capital Gains Estimates: Mr. Economist Goes
to Washington, 44 TAX NOTES 141 (1989); George Zodrow, Economic Analyses of Capital Gain
Taxation: Realizations, Revenues, Efficiency and Equity, 48 TAX L. REV. 419 (1993).
120. See supra note 105.
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Estate tax naysayers would also have a second line of attack. They would
contend that taxpayers who invest in the capital market should be rewarded, not
penalized, for the risks that they undertake.121 The logic of this position is grounded
in the notion that capital investments are, by their very nature, risky. Consistent with
this worldview, according wealth to those undertaking such risks should be
encouraged and applauded—not taxed.
As a fail-safe, estate tax naysayers would have a final argument in mind,
namely, that estate tax imposition undermines small-business enterprises and family
farms. When the estate tax applies, so the argument goes, it forces estates to sell
these enterprises at deep discounts, stripping them from younger and deserving
heirs who have likely toiled hand in hand with the older generation to make them
successful.122 The by-product of estate tax imposition is thus a country destined for
economic turmoil, in which family enterprises are torn asunder and the country is
deprived of a critical component of its workforce.
But in the twenty-first century, the estate tax naysayers’ three contentions ring
hollow, failing to be grounded in reality. Consider the inherent flaws in each of the
naysayers’ arguments against estate tax imposition.
First, when it comes to estate tax imposition, numbers and statistics speak
volumes. Study after study indicates that the vast majority of those taxpayers who
have estate tax exposure are those who derived the mainstay of their wealth via their
capital investments, not their sweat equity (i.e., labor).123 Yes, exceptions to this rule
can always be identified, but these are few and far between and should not dictate
the overall direction of public policy.
Second, risk is inherent in every sphere of human existence. Undoubtedly,
those who make capital investments assume risk, but different career paths involve
risk as well. Consider a PhD student who is getting her doctorate in anthropology.

121. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF CAPITAL GAINS
TAXATION 2 (1997), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/b3116098-c577-4e64-8b3fb95263d38c0e/the-economic-effects-of-capital-gains-taxation-june-1997.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
T3YM-QUNV ] (“High capital gains tax rates lower the return on investment, thus increasing the cost
of capital and depressing overall investment in the economy. Conversely, a capital gains tax reduction
would lower the cost of capital and stimulate investment.”).
122. See, e.g., Danielle Mayoras & Andy Mayoras, Will Estate Taxes Force Al Davis’ Family
to Sell the Oakland Raiders, FORBES (Oct. 10, 2011, 09:02 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
trialandheirs/2011/10/10/will-estate-taxes-force-al-davis-family-to-sell-the-oakland-raiders/
#1337d2087918 [https://perma.cc/QKA9-UYQR ].
123. Robert B. Avery, Daniel Grodzicki & Kevin B. Moore, Estate vs. Capital Gains
Taxation: An Evaluation of Prospective Policies for Taxing Wealth at the Time of
Death, at fig.1 (Fin. and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2013-28, 2013),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2013/201328/201328pap.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
926C-EMX4 ] (unrealized capital gains account for approximately 32 percent of estates worth between
$5 million and $10 million, up to 55 percent of the value of estates worth more than $100 million);
James Poterba & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Burden of Taxing Estates and Unrealized Capital
Gains at the Time of Death, at tbl.9 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7811, 2000),
https://www.nber.org/papers/w7811 [ https://perma.cc/LR3J-C8HG ] (for estates in excess of $10
million, a large component of decedents’ estates is comprised of unrealized capital gains).
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She hopes to secure a tenure-track position at a university; however, if she fails to
secure such a position or secures the position yet fails to achieve tenure,
notwithstanding her advanced degree, she may ultimately be relegated to being a
lowly store clerk. The point is that the time, effort, and energy that taxpayers invest
in capital is often matched or exceeded by the time, effort, and energy that taxpayers
invest in developing and refining their labor skills. Both exercises engender
tremendous risk, and, as such, neither necessarily warrants preferential tax
treatment.
Third, there should be a recognition that the era of small-business enterprises
and family farms and ranches is part of a bygone era. Look up and down Main
Street. Virtually everywhere, there are large-scaled business enterprises and a myriad
of franchises that have driven small businesses and mom-and-pop operations out
of existence.124 Here, too, statistics are telling. A U.S. Census Bureau Report
indicates that only 17.6 percent of the labor force now works for “very small
enterprises” (defined as having fewer than twenty employees); the rest of the labor
force works for small, medium, and large enterprises.125 Furthermore, as reported
by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the farming industry is dominated by a
significant number of large family-owned farms.126 In sum, small businesses and
family farms and ranches no longer constitute meaningful aspects of the nation’s
economic landscape—and those that do exist have little, if any, estate tax
exposure.127
***
What this Part reveals is that the nation’s twentieth-century Code is
ill-designed to meet the demands of the twenty-first century and, in particular, the
Automation Era. The Code currently taxes the income from labor too heavily (at
the possible cost of dissuading its use) and, conversely, does not adequately tax the
income derived from capital (heightening its financial attractiveness). This
unfortunate situation is only going to go from bad to worse as labor income wanes

124. See, e.g., STACY MITCHELL, MONOPOLY POWER AND THE DECLINE OF SMALL
BUSINESS 9 (2016), https://ilsr.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2016/08/MonopolyPowerSmallBusiness.pdf [ https://perma.cc/8PGZ-3TVY ]. Between 1997 and 2012, the number of small
construction firms declined by about 15,000, while the number of small manufacturers fell by more
70,000 [sic]. Local retailers also saw their ranks diminish by about 108,000—a drop of forty percent
when measured relative to population. As recently as the 1980s, independent retailers supplied about
half of the goods Americans bought in stores; today their share is down to about one quarter.
125. See ANTHONY CARUSO, STATISTICS OF U.S. BUSINESSES EMPLOYMENT AND PAYROLL
SUMMARY: 2012 (2015) (U.S. Census Report G12-SUSB), https://www.census.gov/content/
dam/Census/library/publications/2015/econ/g12-susb.pdf [ https://perma.cc/RQ6B-VJZS ].
126. James M. MacDonald & Robert Hoppe, Large Family Farms Continue to Dominate
U.S. Agricultural Production, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Mar. 6, 2017), https://www.ers.usda.gov/
amber-waves/2017/march/large-family-farms-continue-to-dominate-us-agricultural-production/
[ https://perma.cc/5EUV-8QYG ].
127. See id. (“[L]arge-scale family farms . . . made up only 2.9 percent of U.S. farms but
contributed 42 percent of total production.”).
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and capital income increases, triggering tax revenue shortcomings, income
inequality, public expenditure curtailment, and/or deeper deficits.
While strengthening the estate tax does not constitute a panacea, its imposition
can put the Code on sounder financial footing. When it comes to the income
derived from capital, the estate tax sometimes functions as the only tax levied.
Furthermore, in those instances when it constitutes a secondary tax, it’s still playing
an ameliorative role in compensating for the preferential tax treatment accorded
capital gains during a taxpayer’s lifetime.
The next Part discusses the salient attributes of a twenty-first-century estate
tax.
III. ESTATE TAX REFORM IN THE AUTOMATION ERA
The founder of Microsoft, Bill Gates, recently floated the idea of a new tax,
namely, one levied on robots.128 Gates recommended that the resulting revenue be
used to train and retool the nation’s workforce.129 Although levying a tax on robots
is impractical for a whole host of reasons, including our collective inability to define
exactly what is a robot (e.g., whether its scope would include the Mars Rover,
Watson, and any and all plant and machinery),130 there is an element of truth
in Gates’s idea: in the Automation Era, there is a pressing need to tax capital
(i.e., robots) more heavily and to relax taxes imposed on labor.131 Since directly
taxing robots is infeasible, the next question is what indirect modes of taxation exist.

128. The Robot That Takes Your Job Should Pay Taxes, Says Bill Gates,
QUARTZ (2016), https://qz.com/911968/bill-gates-the-robot-that-takes-your-job-should-paytaxes/ [ https://perma.cc/ST6Z-YZEK ] (“In a recent interview with Quartz, Gates said that a robot
tax could finance jobs taking care of elderly people or working with kids in schools, for which needs
are unmet and to which humans are particularly well suited.”).
129. See, e.g., Reuters Staff, European Parliament Calls for Robot Law, Rejects Robot
Tax, REUTERS (Feb. 16, 2017, 11:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-robotslawmaking-idUSKBN15V2KM [ https://perma.cc/Z6GG-R7YZ ] (“But [the European Parliament]
rejected a proposal to impose a so-called robot tax on owners to fund support for or retraining of
workers put out of a job by robots.”).
130. See Jac Depczyk, Why Taxing Robots Is Not a Good Idea, ECONOMIST (Feb. 25, 2017),
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21717374-bill-gatess-proposal-revealingabout-challenge-automation-poses-why-taxing [ https://perma.cc/QAG2-3S8G ] (“Investments in
robots can make human workers more productive rather than expendable; taxing them could leave the
employees affected worse off.”); Noah Smith, What’s Wrong with Bill Gates’ Robot Tax, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 28, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-28/what-s-wrongwith-bill-gates-robot-tax (“The problem with Gates’ basic proposal is that it’s very hard to tell the
difference between new technology that complements humans and new technology that replaces
them.”) (emphasis in original); cf. Robert Shiller, Why Robots Should Be Taxed If They Take People’s
Jobs, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2017, 7:18 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/mar/22/
robots-tax-bill-gates-income-inequality [ https://perma.cc/JK3N-5ACT ] (“If these and other labordisplacing innovations succeed, surely calls to tax them will grow more frequent, owing to the human
problems that arise when people lose their jobs—often jobs with which they closely identify, and for
which they may have spent years preparing.”).
131. Soled & Thomas, supra note 9.
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There are two possibilities with respect to taxing capital. The first is to tax
more heavily the income that capital produces, in particular, capital gains. While this
is an attractive possibility and should be pursued, there are limitations to its
feasibility. As previously pointed out, in a global economy, if legislators were to raise
capital gains tax rates too high, capital might migrate to lower-tax jurisdictions.132
Furthermore, a high capital gains tax rate might curtail income realization events,133
thereby subverting this policy’s revenue-raising objective.
In lieu of raising the capital gains tax rate too high, there is a second and
potentially more viable option to taxing capital, namely, the imposition of a
reimagined estate tax. In Section A, the reasons are spelled out for a reimagined
estate tax in the twenty-first century. In Section B, the public policy implications
associated with a meaningful estate tax are detailed.
A. Twenty-First-Century Reimagined Estate Tax
As the world has gradually shifted from being agrarian-based to being
automation-based,134 the nature of the estate tax has remained relatively constant.135
By definition, an estate tax is “[a] tax imposed on the right to transfer property by
death.”136
In the Automation Era, assuming that a dual estate tax rate structure (i.e., a
high tax rate applicable to capital assets and a low tax rate applicable to noncapital
assets) is a nonstarter,137 something nevertheless should be done to account for the
132. See supra note 10.
133. See supra note 109.
134. See supra Section III.A.
135. See Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 41, fig.C (depicting several significant changes
that the estate tax has undergone since its inception in 1916; despite these changes, the central essence
of the estate tax—a tax levied on a decedent’s net estate—has remained intact throughout this entire
time period).
136. Estate Tax, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979).
137. From the estate tax’s inception to date, Congress has used a single tax rate structure to
determine an estate’s applicable tax burden. As the world has changed, however, the retention of a
single tax rate structure applicable to a taxpayer’s entire net worth may no longer make sense. Bear in
mind that over this same time period, the income tax system has had a two-rate structure in place: as
embodied in Code sections 1(a)–(g), a progressive tax rate structure applies to ordinary income; and, as
embodied in Code section 1(h), a preferential tax rate structure applies to long-term capital gains. Akin
to the income tax system, fairness and logic perhaps suggest that it would make sense to have the reverse
apply at death: a higher estate tax rate imposed on capital assets (e.g., real estate, stock, and bonds)
and a lower estate tax rate imposed on noncapital assets (e.g., notes, cash, and life insurance proceeds).
Notwithstanding the logic of having a dual estate tax rate structure that differentiates between capital
and noncapital assets, for several reasons it would be impractical. For starters, aside from assets, many
taxpayers also have debts; exactly how Congress would choose to allocate these debts between and
among capital and noncapital assets would be challenging. Along the same lines, assets passing to a
surviving spouse may qualify for the unlimited estate tax marital deduction, I.R.C. § 2056 (a) (2018);
however, at the first spouse’s death, a resulting estate tax burden could depend upon which specific
assets of a decedent’s estate (i.e., capital versus noncapital) pass to the surviving spouse and which do
not. Third, because the gift and estate taxes are inherently intertwined, for the sake of consistency,
Congress would have to craft a dual capital and noncapital gift tax rate, inviting its own set of nettlesome
issues. Finally, to reduce their estate tax burden, many taxpayers would feel compelled, particularly in
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tax benefits that inure to taxpayers who amass wealth (both capital and noncapital)
during their lifetimes. To address the tax privileges of capital ownership, Congress
must reimagine the estate tax and institute four critical changes to the current
structure of the estate tax regime.
For the reasons stated below, (1) the lifetime estate tax exemption should be
drastically reduced, (2) the estate tax rates should be significantly raised, (3) the
estate tax base should be made more comprehensive, and (4) the generationskipping transfer tax should be overhauled and strengthened.
1. Drastic Reduction of the Lifetime Exemption Amount
When Congress originally instituted the estate tax, it provided a significant
exemption.138 Over the ensuing years, this exemption was accorded various
monikers, including the unified credit and the applicable exclusion amount; for ease of
reference, this analysis utilizes the lifetime exemption amount phraseology to delineate
this feature of the Code.139 Simply stated, the purpose of the lifetime exemption
amount was to safeguard the vast majority of taxpayers from estate tax imposition,
designed so that only the estates of the nation’s wealthiest taxpayers bore this tax.140
For nearly a century, the lifetime exemption amount operated fairly
consistently. It would exempt approximately 98 percent of taxpayers’ estates from
estate tax imposition.141 There was also consistency in the resulting revenue stream
that the estate tax generated: with some variation, this revenue stream historically
accounted for approximately 2 percent of federal receipts.142
But three relatively recent legislative pieces put an end to this legacy of
consistency. As part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act
(EGTRRA) of 2001,143 over a ten-year period, Congress gradually raised the then
$1 million lifetime exemption amount to $3.5 million.144 In 2010, Congress acted
again and raised the then $3.5 million lifetime exemption amount to $5 million and,

deathbed situations, to shed their capital assets immediately prior to death to avoid what might
otherwise be a heavier estate tax burden. In light of logistical practicalities involving debts, marital
bequests, gifts, and forced deathbed sales, congressional institution of a dual estate tax rate system is
not a viable option to address the flaws related to the Code’s current approach to taxing capital and the
income that it produces.
138. Revenue Act of 1916, § 203(a)(2), 39 Stat. 756, 778.
139. I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2018).
140. See generally Eisenstein, supra note 18.
141. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 41, fig.F. Over this elongated time period, there
were, of course, percentage variations. In 1976, for example, those taxpayers exempt from estate tax
exposure declined to 92 percent, id.; and, conversely, in 2017, those taxpayers exempt from estate tax
rose to 99.8 percent. CHYE-CHING HUANG & CHLOE CHO, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
TEN FACTS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX (2017), https://www.cbpp.org/
sites/default/files/atoms/files/1-8-15tax.pdf [ https://perma.cc/Z5BX-AX57 ].
142. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 41, fig.G.
143. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115
Stat. 38 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
144. Id. § 521.
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for the first time, indexed the lifetime exemption amount for inflation.145 Finally, in
2017, Congress enacted the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which, without any theoretical
justifications,146 doubled the anticipated applicable exclusion amount (after inflation
adjustments, calculated to be $5.6 million in 2018) to $11.2 million beginning in
2018.147
The consequences of raising the lifetime exemption amount and annually
adjusting it for inflation have since become apparent. First, there are fewer estate
tax returns that are being filed annually: the percentage of taxpayers’ estates subject
to estate tax has dwindled to 0.2 percent, essentially a historical nadir for the estate
tax.148 Second, the amount of revenue that the estate tax is anticipated to generate
has correspondingly decreased to below 1 percent,149 essentially another historical
nadir with respect to revenue collection.150 And, as the number of estate tax returns
has declined and revenue collections have sagged, estate tax retention has been
called into question, punctuated by issues such as whether preservation of the
administrative apparatus (e.g., IRS staffing) still makes logistical sense.151
But due recognition must be given to how taxpayers are able to accumulate
wealth. Yes, wealthy taxpayers often work hard, use their ingenuity, and save. Yet,
there are several factors that propel wealthy taxpayers’ wealth that need to be taken
into account. These factors include a tax system that, among other things, accords
preferential capital gains tax rates to taxpayers;152 permits gains recognition
deferral;153 and, finally, applies a tax basis-equal-to-fair-market-value rule at death,
which eliminates future income taxation on asset appreciation.154
Owners of capital are ideally situated to avail themselves of these tax
advantages. In the Automation Era, the wealthiest 10 percent of taxpayers currently
control approximately 76 percent of the nation’s wealth.155 As such, admittedly
somewhat Procrustean, it makes sense to impose the estate tax on the estates of

145. Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3301.
146. See Ashlea Ebeling, Final Tax Bill Includes Huge Estate Tax Win for the Rich: The $22.4
Million Exemption, FORBES (Dec. 21 2017) (“President Donald Trump’s vow to kill the federal estate
tax failed, but his family, and other high-net worth families, could still come out way ahead based on
changes to the estate, gift and generation-skipping taxes in the final tax bill that awaits his signature.”).
147. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. 115-97, § 11061(a), 131 Stat. 2054.
148. See generally JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 19.
149. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 102.
150. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 41, fig.F.
151. See generally Kevin Brady, Cost and Consequences of the Federal Estate Tax, JOINT
ECON. COMM. (2012), https://www.jec.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/bc9424c1-8897-4dbd-b14ca17c9c5380a3/costs-and-consequences-of-the-federal-estate-tax-july-25-2012.pdf [ https://perma.cc/
5EGA-BCBA ] (suggesting that compliance costs are in excess of revenue generated).
152. I.R.C. § 1(h) (West 2017).
153. Id. §§ 1001(c), 1031(a).
154. Id. § 1014(a).
155. Jeanne Sahadi, The Richest 10% Hold 76% of the Wealth, CNN MONEY (Aug. 18, 2016,
6:50 PM), https://money.cnn.com/2016/08/18/pf/wealth-inequality/index.html [ https://perma.cc/
E2YW-KAVT ].
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taxpayers who comprise this select echelon. The rationale for this approach is
simple: during their lifetimes, the Code accorded these taxpayers the financial
privileges and benefits of capital ownership; upon their demise, they should
accordingly pay a monetary “toll charge” for these privileges and benefits. What
Congress must therefore do is reduce the lifetime exemption amount in a manner
such that the scope of the estate tax would extend to a much larger number of
taxpayers’ estates. At the present time, were Congress to make the lifetime
exemption amount $1 million, the estate tax would apply to appropriately 10 percent
of households.156 Extending estate tax application in this fashion would enable
Congress to recoup some or all of the tax benefits it accorded these very same
taxpayers during their lifetimes.157
2. Significant Increase in the Estate Tax Rates
As was the case with respect to the lifetime exemption amount, historical
context is useful to understand the estate tax’s rate structure. When Congress first
enacted the estate tax, the rate structure was graduated and extended as high as 10
percent.158 Over the ensuing years, while the top tax rate fluctuated, it remained
consistently high (from 1932 to 2001, the top estate tax rate ranged from 55 percent
to 77 percent).159 Only at the turn of the century did Congress do an extraordinary
about-face: as part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act,
over a ten-year period, Congress reduced the top estate tax rate from 55 percent to
45 percent;160 furthermore, as part of the Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance
Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010, Congress further reduced the estate
tax to a flat 35 percent;161 finally, as part of the American Taxpayer Relief Act of
2012, Congress made a small increase to the estate tax rate to 40 percent.162
Bear in mind that in the Automation Era, as a result of capital gains tax
preferences, capital ownership has never been so financially rewarding.163 That
being the case, Congress should attempt to recapture some of the tax benefits that
156. See Scott Burns, The New Wealth Scoreboard, ASSETBUILDER (Aug. 25, 2012),
https://assetbuilder.com/knowledge-center/articles/the-new-wealth-scoreboard [ https://perma.cc/
FM6J-7S6V ] (citing to 2010 Survey of Consumer Finances, Dallas Federal Reserve Bank Research
Department, indicating that those age 80 and over who comprise the top 10 percent of net worth
category have an approximate net worth of $1 million).
157. See supra notes 138–140 and accompanying text.
158. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 201, 39 Stat. 756, 777–80 (1916).
159. Jacobson, Raub & Johnson, supra note 41, at 122, fig.D.
160. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 511,
115 Stat. 38, 70 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
161. See Tax Relief, Unemployment Insurance Reauthorization, and Job Creation Act of 2010,
Pub. L. 111-312, § 302, 124 Stat. 3296, 3301.
162. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-240, § 101, 126 Stat. 2313, 2315.
163. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE DISTRIBUTION OF MAJOR TAX EXPENDITURES IN
THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX SYSTEM 18 (2013), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
cbofiles/attachments/43768_DistributionTaxExpenditures.pdf [ https://perma.cc/HE4B-PX9D ]
(“Virtually all of the benefits from the preferential tax rates on those sources of income accrue to the
top quintile of households.”).
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inure to taxpayers during their lifetimes in the form of a reimagined estate tax
applicable upon taxpayers’ demises. The challenging part is to quantify the value of
capital gains preferences and then derive an appropriate estate tax rate.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of this exercise, it is worth undertaking.
Here is an example that can possibly help reveal the appropriate estate tax rate
structure: Suppose that on January 1, 2020, Taxpayer Jay incorporates a new
business enterprise in his garage and that over the course of the next ten years it
appreciates $100,000 annually until it is eventually worth $1 million and is sold on
December 31, 2029. Assume further that on the resulting $1 million gain (i.e.,
$1,000,000 – $0), Taxpayer Jay owed $150,000 of tax (i.e., $1,000,000 x .15). He
would therefore net $850,000 (i.e., $1,000,000 – $150,000). Compare the plight of
Taxpayer Jay with that of Taxpayer Kay, who earns $100,000 salary annually and
pays income and payroll taxes at an effective combined tax rate of 55 percent and
who, over a ten-year period, nets $450,000 (i.e., $1,000,000 – ($1,000,000 x .55)).
The foregoing example demonstrates the need for a significant increase in the
estate tax rate. For starters, at a minimum, the estate tax rate should be equal to 47
percent. Application of this estate tax rate to Jay’s estate would yield an estate tax
of approximately $400,000 (i.e., $850,000 x .47) and thereby reduce his net estate to
$450,000 ($850,000 – $400,000)—the same as Kay’s estate. On its face, this seems
fair and equitable.
But even a 47 percent estate tax rate would likely prove inadequate. As
previously pointed out, the benefits of capital ownership are enormous. For
example, in year 10, had Taxpayer Jay died, the tax basis in his stock would have
been increased to $1 million,164 eliminating any future income tax exposure. In cases
such as this, to secure economic parity, the appropriate estate tax rate should, at a
minimum, be 55 percent so that Taxpayer Jay’s estate would be reduced to $450,000
(i.e., $1,000,000 – ($1,000,000 x .55))—again, the same as Kay’s estate.
Finally, there are other benefits that the Code affords capital gains that need
to be considered in determining the estate tax rate structure. For example, the Code
permits taxpayers to take charitable deductions equal to the fair market value of
their appreciated capital assets;165 defer capital gains recognition utilizing the
installment method;166 and, in the case of small businesses, exempt all capital gains
from income.167 These, and other tax benefits (e.g., ordinary losses on the
disposition of the stock of small businesses168), are hard to quantity and encapsulate
in an estate tax rate structure. Nevertheless, since these benefits constitute
departures from the general income baseline that the Code should tax all accretions

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

I.R.C. § 1014(a) (2018).
Id. § 170(e).
Id. § 453(a).
Id. § 1202(a)(4).
Id. § 1244(a).
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to wealth the same (hence, they are commonly referred to as tax expenditures),169
they should be recaptured, and a taxpayer’s death affords this opportunity. The tax
expenditure budget estimates that the capital gains preference alone exceeds $108
billion annually (estimate for tax year 2018);170 ideally, Congress should consider
calibrating the estate tax rate structure in a manner that recaptures at least this much
revenue in return.
3. Broaden the Estate Tax Base
As currently configured, the federal transfer tax system has several legislative
and administrative mechanisms that taxpayers routinely use to narrow the estate tax
base. The most common involve strategic gifts that engender (i) valuation discounts
and (ii) transfers into trusts with retained interests.
Valuation Discounts. Taxpayers who own closely held businesses that are not
listed on any public exchange are ideally situated to minimize their future estate tax
burdens. Many deliberately divide their property interests and make lifetime
transfers;171 engaging in this tactic enables them to capitalize upon minority and
marketability discounts.172 In theory, valuation discounts associated with minority
ownership are sensible: minority owners often have little or no voice in a company’s
business affairs and, by the same token, bear the risk of having their ongoing
financial interests trampled upon (e.g., by the company according overgenerous
compensation to the majority owner).173 Likewise, according valuation discounts to
nonpublicly traded business interests makes sense, too, because there is no ready
market for such closely held business interests, rendering their sale or other
disposition challenging.174

169. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344,
§ 3, 88 Stat. 937, 938 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1302) (defining tax expenditure as “revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral
of tax liability”).
170. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, supra note 80, at 23 tbl.1 l.70.
171. See, e.g., Reed W. Easton, Give More and Pay Less Tax by Claiming Valuation Discounts,
64 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES 92, 92–95, 97, 99 (2000) (describing the transfer tax savings associated with
transferring divided business interests); Matthew Ressegieu, Valuation Discounts: What Is Required?,
54 PRAC. TAX STRATEGIES (1995) (describing the transfer tax savings associated with transferring
divided business interests).
172. See generally Richard A. Booth, Minority Discounts and Control Premiums in Appraisal
Proceedings, 57 BUS. LAW. 127, 131 (2001) (“[T]he term minority discount as properly understood refers
to a discount from the price that would be set for non-control shares in an active market simply because
they are minority shares and have no power to influence the governance of the corporation and may
therefore be exposed to the possibility of looting . . . . [A] marketability discount refers to a discount
from what a fair trading price would be if there were an active market for the shares.”).
173. Zenichi Shishido, The Fair Value of Minority Stock in Closely Held Corporations,
62 FORDHAM L. REV. 55, 99 (1993).
174. Ashok B. Abbott, Estimating the Discount for Lack of Marketability: A Best Fit Model,
15 VALUATION STRATEGIES 20, 22 (2012).
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Consider an example that illustrates how these two valuation discounts
operate, commonly in tandem. Suppose a taxpayer owns all 100 shares of a closely
held business with an estimated fair market value of $1 million. The taxpayer can
gift forty-nine shares to her daughter and, for transfer tax reporting purposes
(i.e., IRS Form 709 [U.S. Gift and Generation-Skipping Tax Return]), rather than
value the transferred shares at $490,000, can likely take a 40 percent minority interest
discount (i.e., $196,000, or $490,000 x .4) and possibly another 15 percent
marketability discount (i.e., $44,100, or (($490,000 – $196,000) x .15).175 The
combined discounts would result in a reportable gift of only $249,900 (i.e., $490,000
– $196,000 – $44,100). The IRS has administratively conceded that under current
law, valuation discounts of this sort are legitimate.176 With the agency’s imprimatur,
taxpayers have not been shy and, depending on circumstances, have taken
enormous valuation discounts.177
Minority and marketability discounts of the sort just described are not limited
to lifetime transfers. They can also be accorded to business interests owned at the
time of death. In the prior example, consider the transfer tax consequences if the
taxpayer had subsequently gifted another two shares to her daughter, thus leaving
the taxpayer with forty-nine shares. Had the taxpayer then died owning such shares,
her estate would have been ideally positioned to avail itself of significant minority
and marketability discounts. Just as was the case with respect to gift giving, a long
line of cases attests to taxpayers’ estates aggressively taking such valuation discounts
and, in large part, their positions being judicially upheld.178
Transfers into Trusts with Retained Interests. Congress has codified multiple
opportunities that permit taxpayers to retain an interest in property and
simultaneously gift the remainder interest.179 This latitude granted to taxpayers
greatly narrows the estate tax base. Consider two examples—one that illustrates the
dynamics of a personal residence trust and the other that illustrates the dynamics of
a grantor-retained annuity trust—that highlight how taxpayers (with the help of
their skilled advisers) can readily minimize their transfer tax obligations.
Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT):180 Suppose a taxpayer, age 60,
owns a $1 million residence and that the applicable federal rate is 4 percent.181
175. See generally Alan L. Feld, The Implications of Minority Interest and Stock Restrictions in
Valuing Closely-Held Shares, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 934, 938 (1974).
176. Rev. Rul. 93-12, 1993-1 C.B. 202.
177. See LOUIS A. MEZZULLO, VALUATION OF CORPORATE STOCK, in BNA Portfolio 831,
at 4, worksheet 1 (2018).
178. See generally Joseph M. Dodge & Calvin H. Johnson, Passing Estate Tax Values Through the
Eye of the Needle, 132 TAX NOTES 939, 941 (2011); JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, JCS-02-05, OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 396–404 ( 2005).
179. See generally Grayson M.P. McCouch, Rethinking Section 2702, 2 FLA. TAX REV. 99, 99, 101
(1994).
180. See Rev. Proc. 2003-42, 2003-23 I.R.B. 993 (containing a sample qualified personal
residence form).
181. See I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2014) (requiring the Treasury Department to publish monthly interest
tables to value annuities, interest for life or a term of years, or any remainder or reversionary interest).
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Suppose further that the taxpayer establishes a so-called QPRT182 with a twentyyear term (in a nutshell, the terms of a QPRT permit a taxpayer to reside in a home
during its term and authorize the payment of upkeep expenses; at the end of the
twenty-year term (or whatever term the trust settlor determines), title to the house
can pass outright or in further trust to other named beneficiaries). Were the taxpayer
to transfer title to his house into this trust, for gift tax–reporting purposes, its value
would be diminished to $264,780. Over the course of the ensuing twenty years,
suppose the house were to grow modestly in value 3 percent annually; by year 20,
the house would be worth $1,806,111. The difference between the amount reported
for gift tax purposes and the house’s actual fair market value at the end of the trust
term, namely, $1,541,331 (i.e., $1,806,111 – $264,780), constitutes the dollar figure
ultimately escaping from the estate tax base.
Grantor-Retained Annuity Trust (GRAT): Suppose a taxpayer owns all of the
stock in a closely held business worth $1 million and that the applicable federal rate
is 4 percent.183 Assume further that the taxpayer were to establish a so-called
GRAT184 with a three-year term (in a nutshell, the terms of a GRAT require that
the trust settlor retain a fixed dollar amount [expressed as a percentage of the
originally contributed property] for a term of years; at the end of the designated
term, title to the contributed property can pass outright or in further trust to other
named beneficiaries). Were the taxpayer to contribute his entire business interest
into a GRAT and retain an annual annuity of $360,347, for gift tax–reporting
purposes, its value would be $0 (i.e., the value of the contributed gift is $1 million
less the fair market value of the retained annuity interest of $1 million).185 If the
value of the contributed business interest grew a modest 5 percent annually (and
also earned a 5 percent income return), $141,351 would be available in the trust at
the end of the trust term.186 This amount would pass to the remainder trust
beneficiaries free from any transfer tax and, akin to the advantages associated with
QPRT use, escape from being part of the estate tax base.
***
There is a common feature that underpins both discounting and transfers into
trusts with retained interests, namely, valuation manipulation. In the case of
182. Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5(c) (1997). For a detailed overview of the advantages associated
with QPRT use, see Joseph E. Edwards III, Qualified Personal Residence Trusts: A Powerful Estate
Planning Tool, 24 COLO. LAW. 39 (1995).
183. See I.R.C. § 7520(a) (2018) (requiring the Treasury Department to publish monthly interest
tables to value annuities, interest for life or a term of years, or any remainder or reversionary interest).
184. For a general overview of grantor-retained annuity trusts, see, e.g., Robert E. Harrison,
Avoiding Gift and Estate Taxes with Grantor Retained Annuity Trusts, 29 EST. PLAN. 528, 528 (2002).
185. For two excellent articles on this strategy, see S. Stacy Eastland, Optimize Contribution to
Grantor Retained Annuity Trust, 39 EST. PLAN. 3 (2012); and John Goldsbury, If Walton Is Correct, Every
GRAT Should Be Zeroed Out, 29 EST. PLAN. 174 (2002).
186. If the fair market value of the business interest did not grow, the taxpayer could form
another three-year grantor-retained annuity trust and try his luck again, with no financial downside risk.
Jerome J. Caulfield, The Quest for the Zeroed-Out GRAT: Walton Says It Can Be Done,
28 EST. PLAN. 251 (2001); Goldsbury, supra note 185.
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discounting, taxpayers avail themselves of theoretical valuation concerns that are
utterly illusory in the context of a cohesive family unit, whose members work in
unison and harbor no immediate expectation of selling or disposing of the business
enterprise to an unrelated third party. In the case of transfers into trusts with
retained interests, taxpayers have little or no downside risk: over time, the fair
market values of most residences increase rather than decrease, and many business
interests appreciate in excess of the applicable federal rate. The popularity of
QPRTs and GRATs affirms their ability to eradicate part or all of the future estate
tax exposure of many taxpayers.187
In the Automation Era, if the estate tax is to recoup the tax benefits that the
Code currently affords owners of capital, maintaining the integrity of its base is
crucial. Accurate valuation measures constitute a key component of fulfilling this
objective. Congress should therefore enact two critical pieces of legislation. The
first would be to eliminate any valuation discounts associated with intrafamily
transfers; legislation of this sort would essentially mandate that, when it comes to
valuation, if the aggregate ownership of an interest by family members (as defined
under the Code) equals or exceeds 50 percent (using ownership attribution rules),
no minority or marketability discounts should be permitted.188 The second
legislative initiative would be to treat any transfer with a retained interest as an
incomplete gift until the retained interest lapses.189 Enacting both of these measures
would buoy the integrity of the estate tax, propelling it into a meaningful twentyfirst-century mode of taxation.
4. Strengthen the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Regime
Relative to other taxes (e.g., income, corporate, and estate taxes), the
generation-skipping transfer (GST) tax is of relatively recent vintage. Originally

187. Even President Trump and his family have utilized GRATs to alleviate their transfer tax
burden. See Annie Lowrey, Trump’s Shady Accounting Playbook for the Hyper-Rich, ATLANTIC (Oct. 3,
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/game-rigged-and-rich-cheat-anyway/
572032/ [ https://perma.cc/4CHR-7TNX ] (“Among other tactics, the Trump family manipulated
‘grantor-retained annuity trusts,’ or GRATs. The Trumps put assets into these special vehicles and took
annuity payments from them, before passing the assets on to their children. By grossly undervaluing
the real estate in the GRATs—properties valued at $41 million for tax purposes in 1995 were worth
close to a billion dollars when valued by banks a decade later—the family dodged hundreds of millions
of dollars in taxes . . . .”).
188. For overviews and suggested solutions to the intrafamily valuation discounting problem,
see Mary Louise Fellows & William H. Painter, Valuing Close Corporations for Federal Wealth Transfer
Taxes: A Statutory Solution to the Disappearing Wealth Syndrome, 30 STAN. L. REV. 895, 924, 927–28,
931 (1978); and James R. Repetti, Minority Discounts: The Alchemy in Estate and Gift Taxation, 50 TAX
L. REV. 415, 481–82 (1995).
189. See Joseph M. Dodge, Three Whacks at Wealth Transfer Tax Reform: Retained-Interest
Transfers, Generation-Skipping Trusts, and FLP Valuation Discounts, 57 B.C. L. REV. 999, 1001 (2016)
(“The correct solution is to tax retained-interest transfers (broadly construed to include powers to
revoke and possibilities of receiving back income or corpus) when the interest expires, but otherwise
to tax transfers when made.”).
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enacted in 1976,190 Congress retroactively repealed and replaced it in 1986.191 The
purpose of the GST tax is straightforward. It is designed to curtail taxpayers from
transferring wealth to beneficiaries situated two or more generations younger than
themselves192 (in the parlance of the Code, these remote heirs are referred to as skip
persons193). By making transfers to skip persons, taxpayers could delay estate tax
application for decades and centuries to come, eroding the estate tax base at future
generational levels.
Consider how the GST tax operates. Suppose a taxpayer has $20 million of
Amazon stock. The GST tax can apply at three different points in time, referred to
in the Code as direct skips, taxable distributions, and taxable terminations.194 First,
if the taxpayer immediately gifts or bequeaths this stock directly to skip persons
(e.g., his grandchildren or more remote heirs such as great-grandchildren), in
addition to incurring a gift or estate tax, the GST tax would apply and impose
another layer of tax on the transfer.195 Second, if the taxpayer establishes a lifetime
trust for the benefit of a nonskip person (e.g., the taxpayer’s daughter) funded with
the same Amazon shares and, during the course of trust administration, the trustee
distributes such shares to one or more skip persons (e.g., the taxpayer’s grandchild
or grandchildren), the transfer would constitute a taxable distribution and the then
fair market value of the transferred property would be subject to GST tax.196 Third,
had the trust terminated at the demise of the nonskip person and the then assets of
the trust were to pass to one or more skip persons, the transfer would constitute a
taxable termination, and, as such, the then fair market value of the transferred
property would be subject to GST tax.197
The Code presently provides that every taxpayer has a GST exemption
amount equivalent to his or her lifetime exemption amount (currently, $11,200,000
and annually adjusted for inflation);198 the GST tax exemption amount permits
taxpayers to transfer this sum free of GST tax imposition.199 Taxpayers commonly
(i) leverage the GST tax exemption amount and (ii) employ the GST tax exemption
amount to transfer wealth to multiple generations.

190.
191.
192.

Tax on Certain Generation-Skipping Transfers, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1879 (1976).
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085.
H.R. REP. NO. 1380-94, at 46–47 (1976); S. COMM. ON FIN. SUPPLEMENTAL REP. ON
ADDITIONAL COMM. AMENDMENT TO TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, H.R. 10612, S. REP. NO. 94-938,
94TH CONG., 2D SESS. 19, pt. 2 (1976); U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TAX REFORM STUDIES AND
PROPOSALS, at pt. 3 ( Joint Publication of House Comm. on Ways & Means and Sen. Comm. on
Fin., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1969), reprinted in STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 94TH
CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 183–309
(Comm. Print 1976).
193. I.R.C. § 2613(a) (2006).
194. I.R.C. § 2612(a), (b), (c) (1997).
195. Id. § 2612(c).
196. Id. § 2612(b).
197. Id. § 2612(a).
198. Id. § 2631(c).
199. Id.
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GST Tax Exemption Leverage. A common tactic that taxpayers employ to
minimize their transfer tax burdens is as follows: A taxpayer establishes an
irrevocable trust; has the trustee secure a life insurance policy on the taxpayer’s life;
and then annually funds the trust, enabling it to keep premium payments current.200
With respect to trust contributions, the taxpayer may allocate GST exemption
amounts; this practice shelters the trust assets (and whatever they appreciate to)
from future GST tax imposition. To illustrate, suppose a taxpayer establishes a trust
and the trustee secures a $20 million life insurance policy on the taxpayer’s life.
Assume that the annual insurance premiums for this policy are $500,000 per year
and the premiums vanish after ten years. If a GST exemption amount is allocated
to each trust contribution (which is then used to cover the life insurance premium
payment due), the trust will have a so-called zero inclusion ratio.201 As a practical
matter, this means that the $20 million of life insurance proceeds would be entirely
sheltered from GST tax imposition; and, depending on the trust terms, the trust
beneficiaries would not have to fear estate tax imposition on these proceeds for
years, decades, and even centuries to come.
Multiple Generations. Congress designed the GST tax with the idea that an
estate tax should be imposed at least once upon every generation.202 At the time of
GST enactment, Congress relied on the rule against perpetuities to preclude
taxpayers from establishing trusts that extended multiple generations.203 The rule
against perpetuities essentially requires that property must vest within twenty-one
years of a life in being lest the transfer be void ab initio.204 Over the course of the
past two decades, to attract capital investments, many state legislatures have

200. See Robert J. Adler, Impact of Generation-Skipping Tax on Life Insurance Trusts, 24
EST. PLAN. 105 (1997) (explaining how to allocate GST exemption to life insurance trusts).
201. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, Congress Promotes Perpetual Trusts: Why? 9–10
(U. of Mich. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 80, 2014), https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?referer=http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1
&ved=0ahUKEwj287qSqr7YAhXNRN8KHUZhDcUQFggnMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Freposito
ry.law.umich.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1190%26context%3Dlaw_econ_curren
t&usg=AOvVaw3jIxX_ld6uM44MUQLE6ZG5&httpsredir=1&article=1190&context=law_econ_
current [ https://perma.cc/H7ZQ-TMF7 ].
202. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, HISTORY, PRESENT LAW, AND
ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL WEALTH TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM (2015), https://www.jct.gov/
publications.html?func=startdown&id=4744 [ https://perma.cc/PZQ4-QGPT ] (“Another significant
change in 1976 was the imposition of a new transfer tax on generation-skipping transfers generally
equal to the additional estate or gift tax that the decedent’s children would have paid if the property had
passed directly to the children instead of skipping that generation and passing to, for example, a donor’s
or decedent’s grandchildren.”).
203. Mary Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts,
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2511, 2511, 2518–19 (2006); Max M. Schanzenbach & Robert H. Sitkoff,
Perpetuities or Taxes? Explaining the Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2465 (2006);
Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical
Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005); Note, Dynasty Trusts and the Rule Against
Perpetuities, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2588 (2003).
204. UNIF. STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES WITH 1990 AMENDS. § 1 U.L.A. 15
(1990).
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repealed or emasculated their rules against perpetuities.205 This has opened up an
opportunity for taxpayer exploitation of long-term and perpetual trusts that allow
taxpayers’ heirs to avoid estate tax imposition essentially into perpetuity (assuming
that the appropriate GST exemption allocations have been made).206
***
Akin to the need to have a vibrant and well-enforced gift tax, the integrity of
the estate tax base also requires a vibrant and well-enforced GST tax. What is
essential to bear in mind is that, in general, only the wealthiest of wealthy taxpayers
consider having their wealth skip one or more generations, targeting their fortunes
to descendants far down generational lines.207 In the Automation Era, when wealth
disproportionately inures to the owners of capital, the goal is simple: Congress
should restrict this echelon’s ability to safeguard its wealth from estate tax.
Achieving this goal, however, will take a bit of finesse. Two legislative
measures could put an immediate end to the GST tax being upended. First,
Congress should dramatically reduce the GST tax exemption amount to, say,
$50,000. Putting a significant cap on the GST exemption amount would (i) end the
largesse that the Code currently extends to the nation’s wealthiest and (ii) curtail the
ability of the nation’s wealthiest from leveraging this exemption (while, at the same
time, protecting minor gift giving and bequests to grandchildren or more remote
heirs). Second, Congress should preclude GST exemption allocation with respect
to gifts and bequests made to skip persons situated three or more generations
removed from the transferor.208 Adoption of both of these proposed measures
would go a long way toward making the GST tax a meaningful tool to protect the
integrity of the estate tax base and preclude it from being compromised.

205. Mark L. Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149
(2011); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1291
(2013); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?, 85 CORNELL
L. REV. 1035 (2000).
206. See, e.g., Jeramie J. Fortenberry, Use of Dynasty Trusts for Multigenerational Wealth Transfers,
44 EST. PLAN. 35, 36–37 (2017) (explaining how the dynamics of GST trusts operate).
207. See Michelle Canerday & Robert Gerber, Dynasty Trust Planning: A Tax-Efficient Way to
Manage Wealthy Families’ Assets, INVESTMENT NEWS (2015), https://www.investmentnews.com
/article/20150831/BLOG09/150839997/dynasty-trust-planning-a-tax-efficient-way-to-managewealthy [ https://perma.cc/2BJL-RJ6Q ] (“Wealthy families have been taking advantage of an extremely
beneficial estate-planning tool that advisers should be aware of. It allows individuals to pass millions—
and in some cases billions—of dollars to children, grandchildren and future generations without ever
having to pay estate, gift or generation-skipping transfer taxes on such assets, so long as they remain in
the dynasty trust. This strategy is often referred to [as] dynasty trust planning.”).
208. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Effectively Curbing the GST Exemption for Perpetual Trusts, 2012
TAX NOTES TODAY 1267, 1267. Professor Waggoner’s proposal is actually more complex. See Dennis
I. Belcher et al., Federal Tax Rules Should Not Be Used to Limit Trust Duration, 136 TAX NOTES 832,
833 (2012) (“Waggoner suggests that the Internal Revenue Code be revised to prohibit the allocation
of GST exemption to a trust that does not have a required ending date that is either (1) 21 years after
the death of lives in being; (2) 90 years after creation; or (3) the death of the last living beneficiary who
is no more than two generations younger than the settlor.”).
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B. Implications Associated with Proposed Estate Tax Reform
In the Automation Era, having a reimagined estate tax is imperative. In its
absence, vast amounts of wealth can cascade down the generations tax-free. And
while a reimagined estate tax alone will not lessen the need to reform the income
and corporate tax regimes, it could put the Code on more secure financial footing.
The four foremost goals that a reimagined estate tax would likely achieve are
as follows: (1) enhancing fiscal solvency, (2) fostering greater wealth equity, (3)
making capital gains recognition more attractive, and (4) minimizing capital flight
risk. The prospects for each goal’s success are considered below.
1. Enhancing Fiscal Solvency
The federal government is in dire financial straits. In terms of absolute dollar
amounts, the national debt has never been larger,209 and entitlement spending is
poised to swell as the nation’s median age surges.210 To address the pending
financial calamity, cutting government spending is a possible option, but unless
appropriately framed (e.g., the elimination of government waste), it is a politically
unpopular choice. Raising taxes is another option, but unless it is appropriately
framed (e.g., closing loopholes), it is also a politically unpopular choice.
In the Automation Era, estate tax proponents have the opportunity to frame
the estate tax in a new fashion. They should refer to it as a deferred capital tax,
designed to compensate for the multitude of tax benefits that inure to capital
owners during their lifetimes.211 Packaged in this fashion, a meaningful estate tax is
a necessary recapture tax, recouping the financial benefits that the Code accords
taxpayers—primarily those who are wealthy212—during their lifetimes.

209. Kathryn Watson, Under Trump’s Watch, National Debt Tops $21 Trillion for First Time
Ever, CBS NEWS (Mar. 17, 2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/under-donald-trump-nationaldebt-tops-21-trillion-for-first-time-ever/ [ https://perma.cc/WGH6-4ATB ].
210. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2016 TO
2026, at 20 fig.1-3 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-20152016/reports/51129-2016outlook.pdf [ https://perma.cc/GKK2-56PS ] (projecting increases in
overall spending for Social Security and other health care–related programs); Romina Boccia, Think the
National Debt Is Large? Well, the Entitlements Deficit Is Even Bigger, DAILY SIGNAL (2014),
http://dailysignal.com/2014/08/06/think-national-debt-large-well-entitlements-deficit-evenbigger/[ https://perma.cc/TV26-CKCM ] (projecting increases in overall spending for Social Security
and other health care–related programs).
211. See Revenue Act of 1916, supra note 138, and accompanying text; I.R.C. § 2010(c) (2018),
supra note 139, and accompanying text; Eisenstein, supra note 18, and accompanying text.
212. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE & JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, THE DISTRIBUTION
OF ASSET HOLDINGS AND CAPITAL GAINS 16 (2016), https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/
114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/51831-Capital_Gains.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2BMW-P2UR]
(“The proportion of families in a given income group that owned capital assets in 2010 was larger for
higher-income groups than for those with lower income. That pattern was especially pronounced for
nonresidential assets. Among families earning $20,000 or less, 38 percent owned a personal residence,
but only 13 percent held other capital assets. In the highest income group, nearly all families owned
both a home and some other type of asset.”).
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In terms of revenue generation, consider the financial benefits that a
reimagined estate tax would produce. Suppose that the estate tax exemption were
lowered to $1 million (at this rate, approximately 10 percent of U.S. decedents would
be subject to estate tax in 2016213) and the estate tax rate set at 60 percent. Applying
these adjustments in 2013 (the last year that data is available), the number of estates
that exceeded the $1 million threshold was approximately 259,699.214 Assuming the
mean net worth of those dying in this wealth echelon was $3,327,300,215 the annual
estate tax revenue generated would be approximately $362 billion (i.e., 259,699 [the
number of estates that exceed the $1 million threshold] x .6 [proposed estate tax
rate] x $2,327,300 [i.e., $3,327,300 average-sized estates – $1,000,000 exemption]).
Few other Code reforms could yield such significant revenue generation.216
2. Fostering Greater Wealth Equity
The United States has a long history of wealth inequality, which automation
may only exacerbate.217 It is axiomatic that in the absence of a transfer tax regime,
vast amounts of wealth can pass to future generations, perpetuating wealth
inequality; by contrast, the presence of a vibrant estate tax—formulated in the
manner proposed—can go a long way toward helping eradicate wealth disparities.
An example illustrates the virtues of utilizing a reimagined estate tax to help
mitigate wealth disparities. Suppose Rich is a widower with $10 million in stock
equity. Suppose further that Rich has two children, Bea and Kay, and that he dies
after Congress has hypothetically reformed the estate tax (i.e., when the estate tax
exemption is $1 million and the estate tax rate is 60 percent). Rather than Bea and
Kay each inheriting $5 million, they would each inherit $2.3 million (($10 million –
(($10 million – $1 million) x .6) / 2). This effective 55 percent reduction in receipts

213. According to the Survey of Consumer Finances, 2017, 10 percent of taxpayers had a net
worth of $1,182,390 or more. PK, United States Net Worth Brackets, Percentiles, and Top One Percent
in 2017, DQYDJ (Sept. 15, 2018), https://dqydj.com/net-worth-in-the-united-states-zooming-inon-the-top-centiles/ [ https://perma.cc/5HNF-CEYC ]. This $1 million figure was affirmed by
Professor Edward Wolff. See Jeff Sommer, Retirees Face Up to the “Million-Dollar Illusion,” CNBC
( June 10, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/id/100803102 [ https://perma.cc/XDH6-K54B ]
(“Including a home in the calculations, such a family ranks in the top 10.1 percent of all households
in the United States, according to Professor Wolff’s estimates.”); see also Jesse Bricker et al., Changes
in U.S. Family Finances from 2010 to 2013: Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, 100
FEDERAL RESERVE BULLETIN (2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2014/pdf/
scf14.pdf [ https://perma.cc/25CT-82R9 ].
214. See Kenneth D. Kochanket et al., Mortality in the United States, 2013, 178 NCHS DATA
BRIEF 1 (2014), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db178.pdf [ https://perma.cc/2BTWQQLR ] (reporting that 2,596,993 deaths were registered in the United States).
215. Bricker et al., supra note 213, tbl.2.
216. See, e.g., Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale & Jeffrey Rohaly, Options for Reforming the
Estate Tax, 2005 TAX NOTES 379 (2005) (discussing estate tax reforms and the anticipated revenue
associated with the adoption of the proposed reforms).
217. See supra Section III.B.2.
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in Bea’s and Kay’s hands (and others who are similarly situated) would go a long
way toward helping the United States lower its Gini coefficient.218
In terms of reducing overall wealth disparities, the estate tax is probably better
suited to achieve this objective than any other tax regime. For example, the
imposition of a heavier income tax burden might have behavioral effects that cause
the economy to constrict or potentially trigger capital flight.219 In contrast, a heavier
estate tax burden could be targeted to apply to only those taxpayers who are in the
top 10 percent of the wealth echelon, with few downside economic effects.220
3. Making Capital Gains Recognition More Attractive
One reason that capital gains rates are reportedly less than ordinary tax rates
is to ameliorate the so-called lock-in effect—that is, when taxpayers choose to retain
investments rather than sell them, bear the concomitant taxes, and use the after-tax
proceeds to make more favorable investments.221 With the preferential capital gains
tax rate, taxpayers are presumed to be more inclined to sell their investments, which,
as a consequence, allows the government to secure additional revenue.222
But the presence of a reimagined estate tax may serve as a sledgehammer of
sorts to the lock-in effect. Currently, there is inconclusive evidence that the estate
tax triggers taxpayer end-of-life consumption (i.e., a greater propensity to make
purchases [e.g., vacations] that taxpayers might not otherwise make as a way of
circumventing the government’s ability to take away a portion of their family’s
wealth in the form of estate taxes);223 however, if this theory is proven to be true
and if the estate tax rate were raised and the lifetime exemption dollar threshold
lowered, more consumption would therefore occur. To secure this additional
consumption, taxpayers would, by necessity, have to liquidate investments and
recognize corresponding capital gains and losses.

218. See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 102.
219. See, e.g., Joseph Isenbergh, The End of Income Taxation, 45 TAX L. REV. 283, 290–97 (1990)
(describing the impact that income taxes have on consumption and savings).
220. See generally David Joulfaian, What Do We Know About the Behavioral Effects of the Estate
Tax?, 57 B.C. L. REV. 843, 848–49 (2016) (summarizing the research on the behavioral effects that the
estate tax may have upon taxpayers).
221. See supra note 119.
222. An academic and political debate continues to rage, however, over whether a reduced
capital gains tax rate truly entices income recognition and if its costs justify its benefits. Compare Martin
Feldstein, Joel Slemrod & Shlomo Yitzhaki, The Effects of Taxation on the Selling of Corporate Stock and
the Realization of Capital Gains, 94 Q. J. ECON. 777 (1980) (reducing capital gains rates can enhance
revenue generation), with Gerald Auten & Charles Clotfelter, Permanent vs. Transitory Effects and the
Realization of Capital Gains, 97 Q. J. ECON. 97 (1982) (drawing the opposite conclusion). See generally
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 119.
223. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES 5–6 (2009),
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/108xx/doc10841/12-18-estate_gifttax_
brief.pdf [ https://perma.cc/B86A-TRCZ ] (“The estate tax could have varying effects on
consumption, saving, and work effort, depending on people’s motives for leaving bequests to heirs.
Consensus is lacking about which motives predominate or even about whether people work and save
more or less as a result of estate and gift taxes.”).
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4. Minimizing Capital Flight Risk
In the twenty-first century, the world exists in a global economy.224 Goods
and services are exported overseas, and conversely, goods and services are imported
here. Every industrial country is bound to industrial counterparts sprinkled across
the globe. The economic network is deep, entrenched, and intertwined.225
In this global environment, orchestrating appropriate tax rates is challenging.
In yesteryear, in the absence of unanticipated circumstances (e.g., a war), Congress
could decide how much revenue it needed to meet its expenditures and set tax rates
appropriately. That was truly a twentieth-century phenomenon. In the twenty-first
century, Congress cannot blindly raise tax rates without a close eye to what other
nations’ tax rates are.226 Failure to exercise this sensitivity creates a danger that
capital will migrate to lower-tax jurisdictions.227
And this is exactly why a reimagined estate tax is an idea worth considering: it
may help mitigate the capital flight risk. Through their families, jobs, and social
institutions, taxpayers develop deep-seated connections to their domiciles. As such,
it’s truly a rarity for taxpayers to relinquish their citizenship.228 Combine national
affinity with the fact that none of us are immortal, and—voilà!—estate taxes are
essentially unavoidable. That being the case, Congress can use the revenue that the
estate tax generates as a tool to trim other tax rates (in particular, the corporate and
capital gains tax rates) and thereby attract more capital to the nation’s shores.
CONCLUSION
Sometimes people and institutions reinvent themselves. Consider
J. K. Rowling, the author of the renowned Harry Potter series. She was a single
mother who had never written professionally before, but through hard work and
224. See generally Jacob J. Lew, America and the Global Economy, FOREIGN AFF. (2016),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2016-04-11/america-and-global-economy
[ http://perma.cc/8NNN-SW6T ]; FREDERICK S. WEAVER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GLOBAL
ECONOMY: FROM BRETTON WOODS TO THE CURRENT CRISIS (2011).
225. WEAVER, supra note 224; Lew, supra note 224.
226. See, e.g., Gene Epstein, Cut the Top U.S. Corporate Tax Rate to 22%, BARRON’S
(Nov. 26, 2016), https://www.barrons.com/articles/cut-the-top-u-s-corporate-tax-rate-to-221480137247 [ http://perma.cc/KD98-EKHB ] (citing the need to be sensitive to other countries’ tax
rates).
227. See, e.g., Laura Tyson, America’s High Corporate Tax Rate Hurts Everyone, BUS. INSIDER
(May 4, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-high-corporate-tax-rate-hurts-everyone2012-5 [ https://perma.cc/JA8Q-GXSS ] (“In a world of mobile capital, corporate-tax rates matter, and
business decisions about how and where to invest are increasingly sensitive to national differences.
America’s relatively high rate encourages US companies to locate their investment, production, and
employment in foreign countries, and discourages foreign companies from locating in the US, which
means slower growth, fewer jobs, smaller productivity gains, and lower real wages.”).
228. See Robert W. Wood, More Americans Give Up Citizenship in Reverse Trump Bump, FORBES
(Feb. 10, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2017/02/10/more-americans-giveup-citizenship-in-reverse-trump-bump/#5ae3bd11503d [ https://perma.cc/67X5-46QD ] (noting that
even though the number of U.S. citizens renouncing their citizenship is at an all-time high, it is still
relatively miniscule (i.e., 5,411 for 2016)).
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perseverance, she successfully transformed herself into a best-selling author.229
Consider, too, the March of Dimes. This charity was established to rid the country
and the world of polio. Once this objective was achieved, rather than being relegated
to obscurity, the March of Dimes set out to eliminate the occurrence of premature
births and related birth defects.230
Just like people and institutions, taxes and their purposes can be thoughtfully
reimagined. And, in the case of the estate tax, the time is right to do so. For nearly
a century, the estate tax’s focus has been on revenue generation and narrowing
wealth inequities. While these are commendable goals, the estate tax has gradually
lost much of its political allure. Indeed, over the course of the past three decades,
there have been repeated calls for its repeal;231 notwithstanding its retention,
Congress has narrowed its application to an anemic sliver of the nation’s overall
population.232
This is now the appropriate time for Congress to reconfigure the estate tax
and assign it a new purpose. A redesigned and comprehensive estate tax would serve
as a viable vehicle to tax the income that capital generates. Due to globalization,
imposing a direct tax on capital income is inherently problematic; imposing heavier
taxes on income derived from labor is counterproductive insofar as it might further
diminish its use. Imposing an estate tax (which is tantamount to a capital tax) avoids
the globalization problem and, at the same time, reduces the likelihood of having to
resort to heavier taxes being imposed on labor. In the twenty-first century, where
automation is quickly becoming ubiquitous in every sphere of human existence, the
estate tax is thus not only an attractive mode of taxation but also a necessary one.

229. See generally J. K.Rowling, W IKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J._K._Rowling
[ https://perma.cc/MP9H-ZBBJ ] ( last visited Feb. 4, 2019 ).
230. See generally A History of the March of Dimes, M ARCH OF D IMES ,
https://www.marchofdimes.org/mission/a-history-of-the-march-of-dimes.aspx [ https://perma.cc/
U9WG-7C6Y ] ( last visited Feb. 4, 2019 ).
231. See Koba, supra note 33 and accompanying text; McCaffery, supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
232. See GATES & COLLINS, supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX A
TAX
YEAR
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

CAPITAL GAINS
TAX RECEIPTS
($MILLIONS)
12,459
12,852
12,900
18,700
21,453
26,460
52,914
33,714
38,866
35,258
27,829
24,903
28,983
36,112
36,243
44,254
66,396
79,305
89,069
111,821
127,297
65,668
49,122
51,350
73,213
102,174
117,793
137,141
68,791
36,686
55,017
56,682
91,178
98,798
139,127

PAYROLL TAX
RECEIPTS
($MILLIONS)
157,803
182,720
201,498
208,994
239,376
265,163
283,901
303,318
334,335
359,416
380,047
396,015
413,688
428,299
461,475
484,473
509,414
539,371
571,831
611,833
652,852
693,967
700,760
712,978
733,407
794,125
837,821
869,607
900,155
890,917
864,814
818,792
845,314
947,820
1,023,458

% OF CAPITAL GAINS TAX
RECEIPTS RELATIVE TO
PAYROLL TAX RECEIPTS
12.7
14.2
15.6
11.2
11.2
10.0
5.4
9.0
8.6
10.2
13.7
15.9
14.3
11.9
12.7
10.9
7.7
6.8
6.4
5.5
5.1
10.6
14.3
13.9
10.0
7.8
7.1
6.3
13.1
24.3
15.7
14.4
9.3
9.6
7.4

Sources: OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, HISTORICAL TABLES tbl.2.1 (fiscal
year 2018), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals;
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OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, DEP’T OF TREASURY, TAXES PAID ON CAPITAL GAINS
at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-analysis/documents/
taxes-paid-on-capital-gains-for-returns-with-positive-net-capital-gains.pdf.

FOR RETURNS WITH POSITIVE NET CAPITAL GAINS, 1954–2014 (2016), available

